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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5904
This is the first paper to build a comprehensive empirical 
picture of power pricing practices across Sub-Saharan 
Africa, based on a new database of tariff structures in 27 
countries for the years 2004–2008. 
   Using a variety of quantitative indicators, the paper 
evaluates the performance of electricity tariffs against 
four key policy objectives: recovery of historic power 
production costs, efficient signaling of future power 
production costs, affordability to low income households, 
and distributional equity. 
   As regards cost recovery, 80 percent of the countries 
in the sample fully recover operating costs, while only 
around 30 percent of the countries are practicing full 
recovery of capital costs. However, due to the fact that 
future power development may be based on a shift 
toward more economic technologies than those available 
in the past, existing tariffs look as though they would be 
consistent with Long Run Marginal Costs in nearly 40 
This paper is a product of the Sustainable Development Unit, the Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World 
Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted 
at cbricenogarmendi@worldbank.org and mshkaratan@worldbank.org.  
percent of countries and hence provide efficient pricing 
signals. 
   As regards affordability, today’s average effective tariffs 
are affordable for 90 percent of today’s customers. 
However, they would only be affordable for 25 percent 
of households that remain unconnected to the grid. 
Tariffs consistent with full recovery of economic costs 
would be affordable for 70 percent of the population. As 
regards equity, the highly regressive patterns of access to 
power services, ensure that subsidies delivered through 
electricity tariffs are without exception also highly 
regressive in distributional incidence.
   The conclusion is that achieving all four of these policy 
objectives simultaneously is almost impossible in the 
context of the high-cost low-income environment that 
characterizes much of SSA today. Hence most countries 
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Power tariffs: Caught between cost recovery and affordability1 
 
The efficient pricing of electricity is central to a well-functioning power sector. Power pricing guides 
investment  decisions  and  is  critical  for  cost  recovery.  It  also  signals  to  users  the  cost  of  marginal 
consumption and should ideally encourage the optimal utilization of installed capacity. But achieving 
efficient power pricing is easier said than done. The power sector is characterized by substantive up-
front fixed costs, and it takes many years for capacity to be fully utilized. Beyond that, costs vary across 
times of the day (peak/off-peak), seasons (dry/rainy), users (residential/commercial), and geographic 
areas (urban/rural), which should be taken into consideration when setting prices that promote efficient 
use.  
As if the technical issues behind setting efficient tariffs were not complex enough, power providers and 
regulators  also  face  a  conflict  between  promoting  economic  efficiency  and  societal  well-being.  For 
example, if income-challenged groups are to enjoy the benefits of power provision, policy makers must 
set affordable tariffs below production costs or introduce an explicit subsidy regime (Borenstein 2008).  
In defining tariff structures, policy makers must balance the financial sustainability of the sector on the 
one hand and the well-being of various segments of society on the other. Given the importance of 
power, the ramifications of pricing and bill-collection policies are enormous. For example, as imposed 
transfers from the producer to the consumer, below-cost tariffs can seriously hamper the financial 
health of the provider.  
Another  common  way  of  lowering  electricity  prices  is  cross-subsidization,  which  can  only  be 
implemented  if  monopoly  rights  are  granted  to  the  power  utility.  Cross-subsidization  has  several 
undesirable consequences: it discourages use by the overcharged and promotes overconsumption by 
the subsidized. In some cases, it also opens the door for particular interest groups and communities to 
influence policy makers, for example, by asking them to reduce tariffs for select customers such as large 
industrial users. While this may be used as a mechanism to spur the development of select economic 
sectors, the reduced tariffs, ironically, might not even be made available to the general public with its 
more limited purchasing power. How to get tariffs right is a critical question for every policy maker, and 
there is no one answer.  
In this paper we aim to better understand how African countries are dealing with these pricing issues in 
practice. Most African countries have made efforts to organize their tariff structures and levels so as to 
recover utility costs while also providing affordable electricity to poorer  consumers. But this goal is 
challenging and has not been reached in most of the countries examined. Obstacles include  costly 
operational  inefficiencies,  lack  of  economies  of  scale  due  to  geopolitical  fragmentation,  large 
populations too poor to afford tariffs set at cost-recovery levels, and the dauntingly limited coverage of 
distribution networks. 
                                                           
1  Comments  should  be  addressed  to  Cecilia  Briceño-Garmendia  (cbricenogarmendi@worldbank.org)  and  Maria 
Shkaratan (mshkaratan@worldbank.org). 4 
 
The analysis presented here is based on a database put together as part of the Africa Infrastructure 
Country Diagnostic (AICD).
2 The database includes the basic institutional characteristics of African power 
systems as well as standard power sector indicators (performance, capacity, and so on). In addition the 
database documents the power-tariff regimes of 27 Sub-Saharan African countries in detail.
3 Together, 
these nations account for over 85 percent of the population and  gross domestic product (GDP) of the 
region. They were carefully selected to represent the economic, geographic, cultural, and political 
diversity that characterizes Sub-Saharan Africa. They also represent the four Sub-Saharan power pools; 
include countries with small, medium, and large-scale generation; and constitute a representative mix of 
predominantly  thermal  and/or  hydro  power  systems.  As  such,  the  sample  can  be  considered  a 
statistically representative basis for inferring tariff-setting trends in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The tariff data set includes one published tariff regime for each country in the sample. Results presented 
here are based on the latest published  tariff regime available for each country during the  AICD data 
collection period (2003–08). For most countries that year was 2006 (see annex 1). 
Using the AICD database, we seek to characterize African power tariffs by (i) describing prevalent tariff 
structures, both residential and nonresidential; (ii) analyzing their ability to recover costs; (iii) assessing 
their  economic  efficiency  against  long-run  marginal  costs;  and  (iv)  exploring  their  equitability  and 
affordability vis-à-vis country-specific purchasing power. 
What power tariff structures are prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
 
Most electricity tariffs—and Africa is no exception—are based on block tariff-pricing schemes; that is, 
the price of power is linked to the level of consumption.  
Power tariffs are commonly structured around blocks. A block is a  pre-determined range of power 
consumption; with the unit price of each kWh being fixed within the block. The relation between blocks 
and prices defines three types of tariff structures: 
  Increasing block tariffs (IBTs) is a regime in which the unit price per kWh follows an increasing  
step-function linked to sequentially defined blocks 
  Decreasing block tariffs (DBTs) is a regime in which the unit price per kWh follows a decreasing  
step-function linked to sequentially defined blocks 
  Linear tariffs (LTs) are a regime in which all units of power consumed are charged at exactly the 
same rate. 
                                                           
2 http://www.infrastructureafrica.org. 
3 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 5 
 
Any of the above tariff structures may be complemented by a fixed monthly charge, and are then 
described as two-part electricity tariffs. The fixed charge can be used to cover the fixed administrative 
costs  associated  with  serving  a  customer,  and  is  sometimes  also  used  to  discriminate  between 
customers based on other cost-related characteristics such as load served and network location.   
a.  Residential tariffs 
 
Two-thirds of the prevailing pricing schemes in Africa are IBTs, and the remaining third are linear (figure 
1a).  The  use  of  linear  rates  is  more  common  in  countries  with  prepayment  systems  (Malawi, 
Mozambique, and South Africa) (table 1). The prevalence of IBTs is consistent with recent trends in 
power regulation. IBTs have often been put forward as a good tool for reconciling cost-recovery targets 
with distributional aims, although their success in doing so is critically dependent of the details of tariff 
design (Filipovid and Tanid 2009; Borenstein 2008). A more detailed description on residential tariff 
structures practiced in Africa can be found in Annex 2. 
Figure 1. Prevalence of specific tariff schemes 
a.  Block tariff pricing  b.  Fixed charges 
   
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database. 
About half of the sample countries have adopted two-part tariffs (figure 1b), combining fixed charges 
with block tariff pricing. Among countries practicing linear tariffs, the use of two-part tariffs is more 
common than where IBTs are applied. For African countries the fixed charge tends to be relatively high: 
between  $1.00  and  $3.00  per  month  (table  1).  As  a  reference,  the  average  fixed  charge  in  Latin 































































































tariff  schemes6 
 
Table 1. Residential tariff schedules 










Size  of 













Benin  IBT  No  —  3  20  9.6  16.3  70 
Botswana  Linear  Yes  1.63  1  —  5.9  5.9  — 
Burkina Faso   IBT  Yes  1.1  3  50  18.4  20.8  13 
Cameroon  IBT  No  —  3  50  8.6  12  40 
Cape Verde  IBT  No  —  2  40  22.5  28  24 
Chad  IBT  No  —  3  30  15.7  38.1  143 
Congo,  Dem. 
Rep. of 
IBT  No    11  100  3.98  8.52  114 
Congo, Rep. of  Linear  Yes  5.06  1  —  11  11  — 
Côte d’Ivoire  IBT  Yes  0.64  2  40  6.9  14.2  106 
Ethiopia  IBT  Yes  0.16–1.58  7  50  3.2  8  150 
Ghana  IBT  Yes  0.54  3  300  7.6  15.3  101 
Kenya  IBT  Yes  1.74  4  50  4.9  44  798 
Lesotho  Linear  No  —  1  —  7.2  7.2  — 
Madagascar   Linear  Yes  2.98  1  —  7.6  7.6  — 
Malawi  IBT  Yes  0.92  3  30  2  4.1  105 
MWI–prepaid  Linear  No  —  1  —  3.1  3.1  — 
Mali  IBT  No  —  4  200  26.6  31  17 
Mozambique  IBT  Yes  2.79  4  100  4  12.1  203 
MOZ–prepaid  Linear  No  —  1  —  11  11  — 
Namibia  Linear  No  —  1  —  11.7  11.7  — 
Niger  Linear  Yes  0.43  1  —  13.6  13.6  — 
Nigeria   IBT  Yes  0.15–2,38   5  20  0.9  6.5  622 
Rwanda  Linear  No  —  1  —  14.6  14.6   
Senegal  IBT  No  —  3  —  23.8  26.2  10 
South Africa  IBT  No  —  2  50  0  7.2  — 
Tanzania  Linear  Yes  1.93  1  —  10.8  10.8  — 
TZN–low use  IBT  No  —  2  50  4.1  13  217 
Uganda  IBT  Yes  1.1  2  15  3.4  23.3  585 
Zambia  IBT  Yes  1.3  3  300  1.6  3.7  131 
Zimbabwe  IBT  No  —  3  50  0.60  13.5  2,159 
 
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
Note: For details see annex 2. MWI = Malawi; MOZ = Mozambique; TZN = Tanzania. 
— Not available. 
   
The structure of blocks—their number, size, and respective price levels—is what ultimately defines how 
tariffs  reflect  costs,  affect  demand,  and  address  equity  issues.  The  sample  countries  have  adopted 
widely differing approaches to tariff design, with one third of countries practicing linear tariffs (as in 
Rwanda and Tanzania) and the remaining two thirds practicing IBTs.  
Looking at the two thirds of sample countries that practice IBTs, most have adopted relatively simple 
structures (figure 2a) with two or three blocks (as in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia). A minority of countries have 
opted for more complicated  structures that use four and more blocks (the Democratic Republic of 7 
 
Congo,  Ethiopia,  Kenya,  Mali,  Mozambique,  and  Nigeria).  The  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo  is  an 
extreme case, as it uses an 11-block IBT. Interestingly enough, despite the large number of blocks, the 
price difference across blocks is very small, suggesting that the regime is complicated without really 
discriminating very much between large and small consumers.  
Figure 2. Characterization of residential block pricing  
a. Number of pricing blocks  b. Tariff  price  differential  between  first  and  highest 
block (%) 
   
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
 
The conventional wisdom is that IBTs are designed so that the first and smallest “lifeline” block covering 
subsistence consumption is subsidized to promote equity, while the subsequent blocks are priced at a 
higher level that will ultimately enable cost recovery. This of course assumes that poorer customers will 
have lower consumption. This assumption is more reasonable in the case of power – where usage is 
driven by ownership of appliances more prevalent among wealthier households and businesses – than it 
is for example in the water sector – where usage is more correlated with the size of the household. 
The first question is whether African countries tend to define the consumption level of the first block at 
a level low enough to be consistent with subsistence consumption and hence with the “lifeline” principle 
underlying this tariff design (table 2). The response to this question is quite positive. Two-thirds of the 
sample countries define the first block at 50 kilowatt-hours (kWh)/month or less; a consumption level 
that is below the average residential power consumption in Africa (75-100 kWh/month) (Foster and 
Briceño-Garmendia 2009). For example, Uganda sets the first block at 15 kWh/month; Cape Verde and 
Côte  d’Ivoire  at  40  kWh/month;  and  Burkina  Faso,  Cameroon,  Ethiopia,  Kenya,  Tanzania  at  50 
kWh/month. But the sizes of the first blocks in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (100 
kWh), Mali (200 kWh) and in Zambia and Ghana (300 kWh) seem too high to meet the needs of low-



























































Table 2. Size of the first pricing block, and differential between that and second 
1st  block  monthly 
consumption  threshold 
(kWh) 
Countries  Price  differential  between  first  and 
second block (%) 
300  Ghana, Zambia  Between 30 and 100 
200  Mali  Less than 30 
100  Mozambique  Over 100 
Congo, Dem. Rep of  Less than 10 
50 or less  Uganda,  Madagascar,  Kenya,  Nigeria,  Tanzania, 
Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, South Africa, Zimbabwe 
Over 100 
Ethiopia, Benin, Malawi  Between 30 and 100 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Burkina Faso   Less than 30 
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
 
The second question is whether tariff levels on successive blocks rise steeply enough to ensure that 
costs can be fully recovered on higher volumes of consumption. This principle holds in many cases. Most 
countries with a first-block threshold set at subsistence consumption levels (50 kWh or less), have a 
price jump of over 100 percent to the second block (Uganda, Madagascar, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, 
Chad,  Côte  d’Ivoire,  South  Africa,  Zimbabwe),  signaling  a  clear  intention  to  differentiate  among 
customers  so  that  larger consumers  contribute  to cost  recovery.  But  the  tariff  structures  of  a  few 
countries—for example, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Cape Verde, and Burkina Faso—
are not highly differentiated by consumption level. This makes the implementation of targeted subsidies 
difficult (table 2).  
Thereafter, prices among higher consumption blocks do not rise as steeply as they do between the first 
and second block. In Burkina Faso, the second block is priced only 6 percent higher than the first one 
and the third block only 7 percent above the second one. In Ethiopia the price increase from the first 
block to the second is 31 percent and from the second to the third, 40 percent. In Malawi, the increase 
is 47 percent in the first case and 42 percent in the second one. 
Despite the fact that IBTs already incorporate a “lifeline” principle, a number of countries have felt the 
need to introduce parallel “social tariff” that provide an even larger discount to qualifying customers. 
For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mali, and Benin (whose block pricing 
structure does not differentiate low-consumption, low-income customers) provide such a parallel “social 
tariff” (table 3).  Most of these social tariffs are linear in nature and include fixed charges; albeit modest 
ones. The criteria for determining social tariff eligibility are usually based either on total consumption or 
technical characteristics of service (voltage, load). The very existence of such parallel “social tariffs” – 
most of which have eligibility criteria based on low consumption – in itself may be a signal that the main 
IBT is not managing to perform its intended social function. 9 
 
Table 3. Tariff schedules for low-income, low-consumption customers 
   Type of tariff 
Fixed charge 
($)/month  Block border 
Price per block, 
cents/kWh 
Benin  social tranche   n.a.                  9.6  
Botswana  n.a.   n.a.      n.a. 
Burkina Faso  block 1, residential            0.18                 14.3  
Cameroon*  block 1 residential           12.90                  8.6  
Cape Verde  block 1, residential   —                 22.5  
Chad  block 1 residential   n.a.                 15.7  
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
of  social tariff            0.01                  4.0  
Congo, Rep. of  n.a.   n.a.      n.a. 
Côte d’Ivoire  block 1 residential            0.64                  6.9  
Ethiopia  block 1 residential            0.16                  3.2  
Ghana  block 1 residential            0.54                  7.6  
Kenya  block 1 residential            1.74                  4.9  
Lesotho  —   —       —  
Madagascar  economic tariff            0.30                25               6.0  
         > 25              27.6  
Malawi  block 1 residential            0.92                  2.0  
Mali  social tariff   n.a.                50              13.2  
                     100              20.3  
                     200              23.9  
         >200              27.7  
Mozambique  block 1 residential   n.a.                  4.0  
Namibia  n.a.   n.a.       n.a.  
Niger  —   —       —  
Nigeria  pensioners’ tariff            0.23                  3.0  
Rwanda  —   —       —  
Senegal  tranche 1 residential   n.a.    150   0.24 
South Africa  block 1 residential   n.a.      —   
Sudan  —   —       —  
Tanzania  n.a.   n.a.                  3.0  
Uganda  block 1 residential            1.09                  3.4  
Zambia  block 1 residential            1.31                  1.6  
Zimbabwe  tranche 1 residential   n.a.                  0.6  
 
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
Note: For details see annex 13. 
n.a. Not applicable. 
— Not available. 
 
Another important aspect of social policy in the power sector has been the growing use of prepayment 
meters. These have dual advantages. On the one hand, they help low income customers to control their 
expenditures on electricity by spreading them out into small frequent payments that they can more 
readily afford. On the other hand, they eliminate the commercial risk to the utility of serving low income 10 
 
customers. Although growing in popularity worldwide, providing a prepaid option is a relatively new 
practice in Africa, and its impact is still not well understood. But for those countries for which data are 
available, roughly 60 percent have introduced the use of prepayment meters (figure 3). Indeed, Lesotho, 
Namibia, Mozambique, and South Africa already offer this option to a majority of residential customers.  
Figure 3. Prepaid services 
a.  Frequency  distribution  of  countries  adopting 
prepaid meters 
b.  Time trend in percentage of customers using 
prepaid meters 
   
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Indicators Database 
 
b.  Nonresidential tariffs 
 
Nonresidential tariffs can be classified in two groups: commercial and industrial (Table 4). Linear tariffs 
are the most common regime for nonresidential customers in Africa (figure 4). About 60 percent of 
commercial customers and over 50 percent of industrial customers are billed based on linear tariffs. A 
more detailed description on commercial and industrial tariff structures practiced in Africa can be found 
in Annexes 3 and 4. 
Pricing  for  nonresidential  customers  is  typically  more  complex  than  for  residential  customers.  It  is 
usually structured as a three-part tariff including a monthly fixed charge (defined by characteristics of 
the network), a demand charge (defined by the level of peak demand served in kilovolts or kilowatts), 
and a volume charge (defined by the energy served and reflected in the definition of the blocks). In 
addition, volume charges may be differentiated by time-of-use (TOU). In fact, only a handful of countries 
(Benin, Cape Verde, Rwanda, and Mali) apply simple linear tariffs to their nonresidential customers 
without making use of any of these additional features. 
Fixed charges are somewhat more prevalent among non-residential customers, than was the case for 
































percentage of  customers with prepaid 
meters
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Tanzania 4 4
Benin 0 0 6 6 6 7
Burkina Faso 10 10 10 10 10 10
Malawi 2 4 6 8 10 14




Lesotho 100 100 100 100
South Africa 10011 
 
Demand charges are widespread for non-residential customers, but are almost twice as frequent for 
industrial customers as for commercial customers (figure 4b). This suggests that most countries find it 
important to reflect load considerations in designing tariffs for nonresidential customers (table 3). Peak 
demand is a critical cost driver in the power sector, because it defines the amount of installed capacity 
needed to provide a given volume of electricity. 
Figure 4. Prevalence of specific tariff schemes: Commercial and industrial users 
a. Tariff type  b. Fixed charges 
   
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
 
Figure 5. Characterization of nonresidential block pricing  
a.  Numbers of pricing blocks  b. Nonlinear tariff price differential between first and last 
block (%) 
   
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
 
Volume charges for nonresidential customers are typically linear for at least 15 of the countries in the 
sample. In the cases where block tariff structures are used, they are more frequently decreasing blocks 
(DBT) rather than increasing blocks (IBT) and these are relatively simple with not more than three blocks  
(figure  5b).  The  reason  for  preferring  decreasing  blocks  is  to  capture  the  strong  scale  economies 
associated  with  power  generation  and  transmission.  The  volumetric  charge  tends  to  be  higher  for 
commercial than for industrial customers. Most commercial tariffs start at over 12 cents/kWh, while 
most industrial tariffs start at around 8–10 cents/kWh. On average, African commercial tariffs are about 
40 percent higher than industrial ones. Only the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, 
















































































































Table 4. Nonresidential tariff regimes 
  Commercial  Industrial 













Benin  Linear  No  No  Linear  No  No 
Botswana  Linear  No  No  Linear  Yes  Yes 
Burkina Faso   TOU  Yes  Yes  TOU  Yes  Yes 
Cameroon  DBT  No  Yes  TOU  No  Yes 
Cape Verde  Linear  No  No  Linear  No  No 
Chad  IBT  No  Yes  TOU  No  Yes 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. of 
DBT  No  No  DBT  No   No 
Congo, Rep. of  Linear  Yes  No  Linear  Yes  Yes 
Côte d’Ivoire  DBT  Yes  No  TOU  Yes  No 
Ethiopia  TOU  Yes  No  TOU  Yes  No 
Ghana  IBT  Yes  No  Linear  Yes  Yes 
Kenya  Linear  Yes  No  DBT  Yes  Yes 
Lesotho  Linear  No  Yes  Linear  No  Yes 
Madagascar   Linear  Yes  Yes  Linear  Yes  Yes 
Malawi  Linear  Yes  Yes  Linear  Yes  Yes 
Mali  Linear  No  No       
Mozambique  Linear  Yes  Yes  Linear  Yes  Yes 
Namibia  Linear  Yes  Yes  Linear  Yes  Yes 
Niger  Linear  Yes  Yes  Linear  Yes  Yes 
Nigeria   IBT  Yes  No  IBT  Yes  Yes 
Rwanda  Linear  No  No  Linear  No  No 
Senegal  TOU  Yes  No  TOU  Yes  No 
South Africa  IBT/Linear  Yes  No  TOU  Yes  Yes 
Tanzania  Linear  Yes  Yes  Linear  Yes  Yes 
Uganda  TOU  Yes  No  TOU  Yes  Yes 
Zambia  Linear  Yes  No  DBT  Yes  Yes 
Zimbabwe  Linear  Yes  Yes  Linear  Yes  Yes 
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
Note: IBT – increasing block tariff; DBT  – decreasing block tariffs; TOU  – time of  use tariff. Source: Africa 
Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
Time-of-use tariffs (TOUs) are only practiced in a minority of cases, and are twice as prevalent among 
industrial tariff structures as among commercial tariff structures. TOUs allow power consumption to be 
associated  with  hours  (peak/off-peak/night)  and/or  seasons  (summer/winter,  dry/regular),  creating 
incentives  for  more  efficient  use  of  the  power  network.  One-third  of  industrial  and  one-fifth  of 
commercial tariff regimes in Africa incorporate TOUs.  
 13 
 
Table 5. Nonresidential blocks: Number, size, and price level 





 First block  
Price differential 
between first 





First block  Price 
differential 
between first 
and last block 
(%)  Size 
Price 
(cents)  Size 
Price 
(cents) 
Benin  1  n.a.  15.1  —  1  n.a.  10.7  — 
Botswana  1  n.a.  6.7  —  1  n.a.  3.1  — 
Burkina Faso   2  TOU  31.6  –47  2  TOU  22.6  –54 
Cameroon  2  180kWh/kVA   11.3  –12  2  TOU  8.7  –2 
Cape Verde  1  n.a.  21.8  —  1  n.a.  17.7  — 
Chad  3  30 kWh  15.9  152  3  TOU  20.5  85 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. of  5 
200 kWh  11.1  –4 
5  200 
15.2 
-4 
Congo, Rep.  1  n.a.  9.7  —  1  n.a.  11.2  — 
Côte d’Ivoire  2 
18/kVA 
bimonthly 
18.6  –15 
3  TOU 
10.7 
–18 
Ethiopia  3  TOU  6.7  –6  3  TOU  4.7  26 
Ghana  3  300  11.1  44  1  n.a.  5.4  — 
Kenya  1 






Lesotho  1  n.a.  1.2  —  1  n.a.  1.1  — 
Madagascar   1  n.a.  16.9  —  1  n.a.  9.9  — 
Malawi  1  n.a.  3  —  1  n.a.  2.4  — 
Mali  1  n.a.  23.2  —  0  n.a.    — 
Mozambique  1  n.a.  5.4  —  1  n.a.  4.5  — 
Namibia  1  n.a.  8.4  —  1  n.a.  7.7  — 
Niger  1  n.a.  12.2  —  1  n.a.  8.8  — 
Nigeria   4 






Rwanda  1  n.a.  17.2  —  1  n.a.  17.2  — 
Senegal  2  TOU  14.4  44  2  TOU  11.8  45 
South Africa  3/1  25 kVA  4  138  2  TOU  2.6  –31 
Tanzania  1  n.a.  5.3  —  1  n.a.  4.9  — 
Uganda  1  n.a.  21.8  —  1  n.a.  16.7  — 
Zambia  1  n.a.  3.7  —  4  1200  2.2  –45 
Zimbabwe  1  n.a.    —  1  n.a.    — 
 
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 





Do power tariffs recover costs? 
a.  What is the level of average effective residential tariffs? 
 
The effective tariff is the price per kilowatt-hour of electricity consumed at a specific consumption level 
when all charges—variable and fixed—are taken into account. In a multipart tariff system with a block 
pricing  scheme,  the  difference  between  the  effective  tariff  for  a  kilowatt-hour  at  a  low  level  of 
consumption and a kilowatt-hour at a high level of consumption can be significant.  
The  effective  tariff  is  calculated  by  dividing  the  total  bill  based  on  the  current  tariff  schedule  (in 
currency) by consumption (in kilowatt-hours). It can also be referred to as the unit price at a particular 
consumption level. Based on the two-part tariffs described in the preceding section, effective residential 




i / ) ( 1 1       , where  a  is  the 
metered consumption unit price (per kilowatt-hour), x is the volume consumed (metered), i is the block 
number (in the case of block tariffs), and b is the fixed charge.
4 Effective tariffs allow for analyzing 
pricing patterns at different consumption levels as well as comparing price levels with cost recovery and 
affordability benchmarks.  
For the purpose of this analysis, one re sidential schedule per country was selected. The selection of a 
specific tariff schedule for the calculation of the effective tariff was done to capture the largest share of 
residential consumers based on the most  commonly used tariff schedule, or the one  that most closely 
corresponds to the  monthly average consumption for that country. For example, in South Africa, the 
residential schedule selected was the “Home Light 1” prepayment option because this is the one that 
would be most attractive to a South African household with the average residential power consumption 
level. While South Africa has an admittedly complicated tariff system, other African countries also offer 
two  or  three  residential  schedules.  For  effective  residential  tariff  calculations,  the  lower-usage 
residential tariff was used and the “social tariff” (where relevant) was analyzed separately. Annex 5 lists 
the representative tariff schedule used for each country. 
Table  6  showcases  the  calculation  of  effective  residential  tariffs  for  select  African  countries.  The 
variation in effective tariffs for the first consumption tranche (up to 50 kWh/month) is enormous, going 
from zero in South Africa to about 24 cents/kWh in Cape Verde (table 6). But over 60 percent of African 
countries establish prices below 10 cents/kWh for their smallest consumers. For average consumption 
levels  of  100  kWh/month,  Africa  has  effective  tariffs  ranging  from  3  cents  to  30  cents,  which  is 
undoubtedly a wide range. 
   
                                                           
4 Generally there is a third component in the formula that captures maximum demand level and its price. But the 
demand part of the formula is not applicable to residential customers 15 
 
 
Table 6. Effective residential tariffs by level of consumption (cents) 
   Level of consumption (kWh/month) 
   50  75  100  150  200  300  400  450  500  900 
 Benin  12.6  13.3  13.6  14.0  14.1  19.7  22.5  23.5  24.2  27.2 
 Botswana   9.1  8.0  7.5  6.9  6.7  6.4  6.3  6.2  6.2  6.0 
 Burkina Faso   20.6  20.2  20.0  19.9  19.8  20.1  20.3  20.4  20.4  20.6 
 Cameroon   8.6  10.9  10.9  10.9  10.9  12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0  12.0 
 Cape Verde   23.6  25.1  25.8  26.5  26.9  27.3  27.4  27.5  27.5  27.7 
 Chad   22.9  27.3  30.0  32.7  34.1  35.4  36.1  36.3  36.5  37.2 
 Congo, Dem. 
Rep. of 
4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  3.9  3.9  3.9  3.9  5.5 
 Congo, Rep. of  21.1  17.7  16.0  14.3  13.5  12.6  12.2  12.1  12.0  11.5 
 Côte d’Ivoire   9.6  11.1  11.9  12.6  13.0  13.4  13.6  13.6  13.7  13.9 
 Ethiopia   3.9  4.1  4.1  5.3  5.6  6.1  6.2  6.4  6.6  7.2 
 Ghana   8.7  8.4  8.2  8.0  7.9  7.8  9.1  9.6  9.9  11.8 
 Kenya   8.4  12.7  14.8  16.9  18.0  19.1  19.9  20.1  20.4  21.2 
 Lesotho   7.2  7.2  7.2  7.2  7.2  7.2  7.2  7.2  7.2  7.2 
 Madagascar   6.0  4.0  3.0  2.0  1.5  1.0  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.3 
 Malawi   4.8  4.3  4.0  3.8  3.7  3.6  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.4 
 Mali   26.6  26.6  26.6  26.6  26.6  28.1  28.8  29.1  29.3  30.0 
 Mozambique   9.6  7.7  6.8  7.4  7.7  9.0  9.6  9.8  10.0  10.9 
 Namibia   11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7 
 Niger   14.5  14.2  14.1  13.9  13.9  13.8  13.7  13.7  13.7  13.7 
 Nigeria   2.5  3.8  3.4  3.8  4.2  4.9  5.3  5.4  5.6  6.0 
 Rwanda   14.6  14.6  14.6  14.6  14.6  14.6  14.6  14.6  14.6  14.6 
 Senegal   23.8  23.8  23.8  23.8  24.2  24.8  25.1  25.2  25.3  25.7 
 South Africa   —  2.4  3.6  4.8  5.4  6.0  6.3  6.4  6.5  6.8 
 Sudan   —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 
 Tanzania   3.2  5.5  6.7  7.9  8.5  9.0  8.8  8.8  8.8  8.6 
 Uganda   19.5  20.7  21.4  22.0  22.3  22.6  22.8  22.8  22.9  23.1 
 Zambia   4.2  3.3  2.9  2.4  2.2  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.5 
                     
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 




Figure 6. Effective residential tariff for 100 kWh (cents/kWh) 
 
 
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
 
On average, residential electricity in Africa is among the most expensive in the world. For the average 
consumer, residential tariffs are over 12 cents/kWh in about 60 percent of the sample countries and 
over  20  cents/kWh  in  close  to  25  percent  of  the  sample  (Burkina  Faso,  Cape  Verde,  Uganda, 
Madagascar, Mali, and Chad) (figure 6). To compare it against other world regions, Africa’s residential 
electricity price averages between 50 and 150 percent higher than the 8 cents/kWh in Latin-America, 
Eastern Europe, and East Asia, and up to 400 percent higher than average residential tariffs in South 
Asia.  
What is the pattern of average effective residential tariffs across levels of consumption? Tariffs that 
increase with consumption effectively impose a penalty on higher consumption and vice versa. About 
half of the sample countries have increasing average effective residential tariffs (for example, Cape 
Verde, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, and 
Uganda [figure 7a and b]). One-third of countries have decreasing average effective residential tariffs, 
not only because they have explicitly adopted DBT (for example, Senegal) but also because the size of 
their first blocks is large meaning that the weight of the fixed charge is spread across a larger tranche of 
consumption. Countries with decreasing residential tariffs include Cameroon, Malawi, Zambia, Senegal, 


























































































































































































































Figure 7. Effective tariffs across various consumption levels 
a.  Highly increasing  b.  Moderately increasing 
   
c.  Neutral  d.  Decreasing 
   
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
 
b.  What is the level of average effective nonresidential tariffs? 
 
As for residential tariffs, one commercial and one industrial schedule per country were selected for our 
analysis of nonresidential tariffs. Representative or typical commercial customers are defined as small to 
medium business users with an average consumption level of 900 kWh/month. Representative or typical 
industrial customers are medium to large business users usually associated with high-voltage, high-
usage tariffs. But in order to exclude very large industries with preferential tariffs from our analysis, we 
did  not  use  the  highest  voltage  bracket  included  in  tariff  schedules  (box  1).  In  cases  where  tariff 
schedules for commercial and industrial users are not differentiated or where several tariffs apply to 
commercial users, tariff schedules were selected based on both voltage level and load. For example, 
commercial  customers  were  associated  with  a  tariff  for  medium-voltage  and  medium-consumption 
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Zambia Congo, Rep. Botswana18 
 
Box 1. Special tariffs for large electricity users: The case of Zambia 
 
The average effective power tariff in Zambia, at 3 cents/kWh, is one of the lowest in Africa. This current level does 
not even allow for the recovery of operating costs, yet alone total costs—even though Zambia has one of the lowest 
average costs in the region (due to a combination of hydropower technologies and excess generation capacity). 
Such inefficient pricing policies are compounded by the exceptionally favorable prices that the power utility ZESCO 
gives to mining companies, in particular the Copperbelt Energy Corporation (CEC). A long-term agreement set 
mining tariffs at 2 cents/kWh, not only below cost recovery but also one-third lower than the effective tariff for an 
average residential customer (100 kWh/month).  
As the mining sector is the recipient of 50 percent of total ZESCO sales, this translates into a conservative estimate 
of $30 million in annual subsidies with a projected cumulative deficit of $926 million over the next 10 years. 
Zambia’s case is not unique in the region. Until 2003 Ghana’s power distribution company, VRA, was engaged in a 
long-term agreement with Volta Aluminum Company, which was VRA’s most important customer, consuming one-
third of its power generation and benefiting from a preferential electricity price estimated to be half of the cost-
recovery level. 
 
Source: Zambia Electricity Regulator Board 2008; World Bank 2008; Chivakul and York 2006 
 
 
Table 7 lists the effective nonresidential tariffs for select African countries. Commercial effective tariffs 
are  higher  overall  than  industrial  ones  at  similar  levels  of  consumption.  Two-thirds  of  the  sample 
countries have commercial tariffs that are, on average, 20–30 percent higher than the industrial ones 
(table 7). These countries include Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Madagascar, and Ethiopia. Another 
handful of countries have even higher price differentials—Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, and South Africa have 
commercial effective tariffs between 40 and 77 percent higher than industrial tariffs. This pattern is not 
unusual, as the genuine production costs of the high-voltage power consumed by industrial users are 
lower and exposed to fewer transmission and distribution losses (figure 8). The Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Mozambique are notable exceptions to this pattern: commercial customers pay on average 
30–40 percent more than industrial customers.  19 
 
Table 7. Effective nonresidential tariffs by level of consumption (cents) 
   Commercial  Industrial 
   Level of consumption (kWh)/month  Level of demand 
  450  900  2,500  5,000  10 kVA 
100 
kVA 
Benin       15.1        15.1        15.1        15.1       10.7       10.7  
Burkina Faso       27.0        26.7        26.5        26.5       14.1       15.0  
Cameroon       11.7        11.4        11.3        11.2        8.8        9.2  
Cape Verde       21.8        21.8        21.8        21.8       17.7       17.7  
Chad       43.7        44.7        45.3        45.5       45.6       38.8  
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. of 
     11.0        11.0        10.8        10.8       14.6       14.6  
Côte d’Ivoire       17.8        16.9        16.3        16.1       10.7       10.7  
Ethiopia        9.8         8.3         7.3         7.0        4.8        4.7  
Ghana       12.6        13.9        15.2        15.6        5.7        6.4  
Kenya       22.1        21.7        21.5        21.4       16.6       15.1  
Lesotho        9.3         9.3         9.3         9.3        1.5        3.3  
Madagascar       30.9        25.3        21.7        20.7       11.1       10.5  
Malawi        8.1         6.9         6.1         5.8        2.6        3.1  
Mozambique        9.0         8.0         7.5         7.3        4.7        5.1  
Namibia       15.2        14.0        13.2        13.0       12.7       13.6  
Niger       13.4        13.2        13.0        12.9        9.0        9.3  
Nigeria         5.1         5.0         5.0         5.5        5.0        5.1  
Rwanda       17.2        17.2        17.2        17.2       17.2       17.2  
Senegal       23.8        22.8        26.2        26.0       15.8       15.8  
South Africa       11.4         7.7         5.3         4.7        2.7        2.7  
Tanzania        8.6         8.0         7.6         7.5        5.0        5.4  
Uganda       22.0        21.9        21.8        21.8       16.8       17.0  
Zambia        5.1         4.4         3.9         3.8        2.3        2.5  
Congo, Rep. 
of 
     11.7        10.7        10.1         9.9       11.2       11.2  
Mali       23.2        23.2        23.2        23.2        
Botswana        7.7         7.2         6.9         6.8        3.3        4.0  
 
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
Notes: Average commercial consumption level is highlighted in bold — Not available. 
 
 
Figure 8. Increasing, decreasing, and neutral tariff structures 
 




























type of effective tariff structure
increasing neutral decreasing20 
 
c.  What have been historic costs of power production? 
 
As we have discussed, Africa faces effective tariffs that are up to twice as high as in other developing 
regions. This reflects the use of costly technologies as well as the small scale of most African power 
generation systems.  
But  what  have  been  the  historic  costs  across  the  various  power  systems?  The  first  step  toward 
answering this question is to attribute to each kilowatt-hour produced both the capital and operating 
(O&M) costs of the three power production segments: generation, transmission, and distribution. 
O&M unit costs are  calculated by  prorating total operational costs (as reported in utilities’ income 
statements) by the total generated electricity over a given year. Data are derived from the AICD’s fiscal 
spending database,
5 and individual results  have been verified  by country power experts. Operational 
costs include salaries associated with system operations, fuel charges, the cost of parts needed for daily 
operations, and so on. 
 
Unit  capital  costs  are  calculated  using  the  levelized  power  methodology  (commonly  used  by  the 
International Energy Agency). This requires allocating the value of an asset over its lifetime capacity. In 
essence the unit capital cost is a ratio of the net present value of total lifetime investment to the total 
electricity produced.
6 For this purpose an annualization factor is applied to the value of generation, 
transmission, and distribution assets. The overnight investment or capital needed to replace existing 
assets is the proxy for asset value, to allow for cross-country comparison. 
 
The annualization factor is a reversed version of a standard formula for  the net present value of a 
periodic investment of equal amount. It takes into account both depreciation and interest rates: 
T r
r
OI A C C   
 
) 1 ( 1  ; where ACC is annualized capital cost, OI is overnight investment, r is annual 
discount rate, and T is plant life (in years). 
 
In most African countries, the cost of each kilowatt-hour is 10–20 cents (figure 9).  In a  handful of 
countries—such as South Africa, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and 
Malawi (all of them significant hydro-power producers, with the exception of South Africa)—the power 
cost is below 10 cents/kWh. Niger and Mali, at the upper extreme, have unit costs over 30 cents/kWh. 
The balance between capital and operating costs also varies from country to country, largely determined 
by generation technology. By way of example, capital costs as a percentage of total costs range from 14 
percent in Botswana to 77 percent in Nigeria. Full details of these calculations are provided in Annexes 
6-8. 
 
                                                           
5 http://www.infrastructureafrica.org. 
6  Lifetime capital costs are estimated using: (i) the discounted net present value of lifelong capital costs (for 
example, the sum of the annual investment expenditure throughout the life of a plant), (ii) the discounted historical 
cost of existing assets, and (iii) the relative value of a similar asset (replacement cost). We are using method (i), with 
the overnight construction costs as a proxy for the net present value of the lifelong investment expenses. 21 
 
Figure 9. Historic power costs in select African countries (cents/kWh) 
 
 
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
Note: For details see annex 8. 
 
But what drives costs? In general, hydro-based systems tend to be more skewed towards capital cost 
and  thermal-based  systems  more  skewed  toward  operating  cost  In  terms  of  geography.  Africa’s 
landlocked and island nations seem to bear a significant power cost disadvantage vis-à-vis the coastal 
countries.  High  power  costs  are  also  driven  by  the  size  of  markets  and  their  associated  scales  of 
production (figure 10). 
Figure 10. Differences in average costs (US cents per kWh) 
a. According to type of power system  b.  According to geography  c.  According to system size 
     
   
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
Note: For details see annex 7. 
d.  Do average effective tariffs cover historic costs?  
 
Existing effective tariffs allow for the recovery of operational costs for close to 80 percent of African 
countries (figure 11b). But when capital investments are considered, the picture looks less rosy. On 


























































































































































































































































< 700 MW 700-1,500 MW > 1,500 MW22 
 
sample countries are practicing full capital cost recovery (figure 11a); Among the countries that should 
be able to cover total costs under existing tariff regimes (contingent on their ability to collect bills) are 
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Namibia, and Senegal.  
Figure 11. Cost-recovery capabilities of effective tariff regimes 
a.  Weighted effective tariffs and total costs  b.  Weighted effective tariffs and OPEX 
   
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
Note: OPEX = operational expenditure. 
 
Lack of full cost recovery can be partly explained by the large weight of residential customers in utilities’ 
revenue structure, whose charges – for political and social reasons – often fail to reflect costs. Excluding 
South Africa, roughly 50 percent of the total power billing in Africa is associated with households, for 
just over 40 percent of the total power supplied (figure 13). This is a very high share by global standards. 
In South Africa, by contrast, the total share of residential billing stands much lower at 17 percent versus 
only 8 percent of total power supplied. Only in 30 percent of the sample countries do residential tariffs 
allow for 100 percent cost recovery (figure 12a). While residential tariffs do better at covering operating 
costs (figure 12b), this is not enough to guarantee financial sustainability in the medium to long term.  
It  is  important  to  underscore  that  setting  tariffs  at  cost-recovery  levels  is  one  thing  and  actually 
recovering costs is another. African utilities are characterized by bill-collection rates of well below 100 
percent. This translates to financial losses that can amount to more than the entire turnover of a utility 
(see annex 14 for details). 
Have  African  utilities  been  improving  their  cost-recovery  rates  over  time?  Power  tariffs  increased 
substantially over the period 2001 to 2005, but not fast enough to keep pace with rising costs (figure 


































































































Historical opex costs, US cents/kWh23 
 
Figure 12. Cost-recovery capabilities of residential effective tariffs at 100 kWh/month consumption 
a.  Total cost recovery  b.  Operational cost recovery 
   
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
 
Figure 13. Household billing as a share of total power billing 
a.  Composition of annual billing per type of customer  b.  Residential share of billing and consumption 
   
 
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
Note: See annex 9 for details. 
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Share of residential bill24 
 
Figure 14. Costs and revenues over time ($/kWh) 
a.  Unit costs  b.  Average revenues 
   
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
 
e.  Do IBT structures allow for costs to be recovered? 
 
As noted above, IBTs are premised on the notion that surcharges on higher volumes of consumption will 
compensate for discounts on lower volumes of consumption, so that the utility breaks even overall. 
However,  this outcome  is  contingent  on the  block sizes  and  associated  price  levels  being  correctly 
calibrated. It is often the case that the surcharges apply (if at all) to very high levels of consumption that 
are  rarely  reached  in  practice.  In  the  case  of  Africa,  the  answer  is  more  promising  than  might  be 
anticipated.  
A minority of countries have residential tariffs that recover costs independent of consumption levels, 
meaning that even the lowest priced block is priced high enough to recover costs (category I in table 8). 
(This is ideal from a cost recovery perspective, but raises questions as to whether these IBTs are also 
performing the intended social function of providing subsidized power to small consumers.) A second 
batch of countries has IBTs that succeed in recovering operational costs (category II), but will not—or 
are not likely to—attain total cost recovery based on their historical average household consumption. 
The third group of countries (category III in table 8) is recovering costs within a consumption range that 
is close to the historic average. Finally, a fourth group of countries (category IV)—given current tariffs 

























Table 8. Break-even consumption levels 
ID   Countries  Operational cost  Total cost 






At any level  At any level 
II  Côte d’Ivoire 
At any level 
90 
Mozambique  300 





At any level  Never 
Nigeria  24 
Never 
Tanzania  155 
III  Botswana  27  20 
Zambia  65  27 
Congo, Rep. of  20  29 
Kenya  50  91 
Benin  12  110 
South Africa  94  290 





Never  Never 
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database 
 
Are power tariffs efficient from an economic standpoint? 
 
We have shown that average effective tariffs are not all that successful at recovering historic costs, and 
this is important from a financial perspective. However, historic costs are not necessarily a good guide to 
future power development costs. What is important from an economic perspective is whether average 
effective tariffs cover long-run marginal costs (LRMC) of system development. In this section we assess 
whether power tariffs provide this correct economic signal, and thus do not lead to the over- or under-
consumption of power from an economic standpoint.  
a.  What do LRMCs look like in Africa? 
 
So far, we have seen that tariffs in Africa are high compared with those in other developing regions, but 
not high enough to allow for historic cost recovery. We have also seen that high tariff levels are a direct 
consequence of high costs, which are driven by the use of sub-optimal primary energy sources (small 
scale diesel versus large hydro), difficult geography (with higher costs faced by landlocked countries and 26 
 
islands), and diseconomies of scale (due to the prevalence of small national systems).  However, in 
principle, these costs could come down in the future as countries harness more cost-effective sources of 
energy and exploit regional power trade to expand the scale of production.  
LRMCs are calculated using a dynamic model that estimates the needs of African power systems based 
on economic growth projections and electrification targets. The model simulates optimal (least-cost) 
strategies for generating, transmitting, and distributing electricity in response to demand increases. It 
also estimates the cost of meeting power demand under a range of alternative scenarios, including 
cross-border trade (Vennemo and Rosnes 2008).
7 
With  few exceptions, a more efficient selection of technologies (with and without  greater regional 
trade) would render LRMCs below 10 cents/kWh (figure 15). Only four countries —Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Niger, and Senegal—would face LRMCs over 20 cents/kWh. 
Developing African power systems with a view toward expanding regional trade clearly reduces LRMCs 
across most countries. In fact, if regional trade were fully pursued countries would see their LRMCs 
reduced by about 10 percent on average, and as high as 40 percent in some cases (figure 16a). These 
would translate into LRMC reductions of as high as 7 cents/kWh, but more typically in the 1–5 cents 
range (figure 16b).  
Figure 15. Long-run marginal costs (US cents per kWh) 
 
Source: Adapted from Vennemo and Rosnes 2008  
                                                           















































































































































































































































































































Current patterns of trade Trade expansion27 
 
Figure 16. How trade expansion would effect long-run marginal costs  
a.  Percent reduction on LRMC  b.  Monetary reduction on LRMC 
   
 
Source: Adapted from Vennemo and Rosnes 2008  
Note: See details in annex 11. 
b.  Do existing average effective tariffs cover LRMC? 
 
It is relevant to ask whether existing average effective tariffs are high enough to cover LRMC even if they 
may not be high enough to cover average historic costs as was demonstrated above. The analysis shows 
that 38 percent of the sample countries have already achieved average effective tariffs that are high 
enough for full capital cost recovery (figure 17a). Compare this with only 30 percent of countries that 
can fully recover historic costs. 
Figure 17. Cost-recovery capabilities of residential effective tariffs vis-à-vis LRMCs 
a.  LRMC recovery, trade stagnation  b.  LRMC recovery, trade expansion 
   






































































































































































































































































LRMC, trade expansion, US cents/kWh28 
 
Are power tariffs equitable and affordable? 
 
c.  Can African households afford power services? 
 
Based on information reported in household surveys, on average power bills absorb almost 6 percent of 
total household budgets. For most countries the share falls below 3 percent; however in a few cases 
(such as Malawi and Mozambique) it can be as high as 10 or even 20 percent (figure 18). This share is 
relatively stable across quintiles.  
Figure 18. Existing household spending on electricity 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Banerjee and others (2008). 
 
In order to gauge whether power is affordable, two types of evidence can be considered. 
One possible measure of affordability is non-payment of services. Based on household surveys, we can 
compare  across  quintiles  the  percentage  of  households  that  report  paying  for  power  against  the 
percentage of households that report using service. Those using without paying include both clandestine 
users who steal power from the network and formal customers who fail to pay their bills. Overall, about 
40 percent of people connected to electricity do not pay for it (figure 19). Nonpayment rates range from 
about  20  percent  in  the  richest  quintile  to  about  60  percent  in  the  poorest  quintile.  A  significant 
nonpayment rate, even among the richest quintiles, suggests that a culture of nonpayment exists in 
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Figure 19. Percentage of the population with service connections who do not pay for service 
 
Source: Banerjee and others 2008. 
 
Another possible measure of affordability is whether the full economic cost of a subsistence level of 
consumption falls above a normative affordability threshold. Economic cost is defined as the tariff that 
would fully cover both operating and capital costs and is country specific; reaching an average level of 
US$0.18/kW for SSA as a whole. Subsistence consumption is defined as 50 kWh per month, which is 
enough to cover very minimal usage for lighting (roughly one light bulb for two hours per day). The 
affordability threshold is typically defined as spending on subsistence power needs of between 3 and 5 
percent  of  the  total  household  budget.  These  values  are  normative,  and  are  informed  by  power 
spending patterns by low income households that have been observed across a wide range of household 
surveys (recall figure 18 above).   
By looking at the distribution of household budgets, one can calculate the percentage of households for 
which subsistence consumption priced at full economic cost would absorb more than 5 percent of their 
budgets and thus prove unaffordable. For example, looking across the distribution of household budgets 
for all of SSA, monthly bills of $2 would be affordable for almost the entire population, whereas monthly 
bills of $10 would only remain affordable for the entire population of middle-income African countries.  
Based  on  existing  average  effective  tariffs,  the  bill  for  subsistence  consumption  levels  looks  very 
affordable for those that are already connected to the grid (Figure 20a). With a 3 percent affordability 
threshold, the subsistence consumption of 50kWh/month priced at the current average effective tariff is 
affordable in 60 percent of the sample countries. If the affordability threshold is further raised to 5 
percent,  the  subsistence  consumption  is  affordable  in  over  90  percent  of  the  sample  countries. 
However, the picture looks very different for those that are not currently connected to the grid. In these 
cases, the subsistence consumption level priced at the current average effective tariff would only be 
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majority of those connected can afford power at existing prices, while a significant majority of those 
unconnected cannot do so. This raises questions of circularity: either existing tariffs determine who is 
connected or tariffs are designed to be affordable to those who are connected. 
 
Figure 20. Monthly electricity expenditure as a percentage of total household budget 
a.  Connected households  b.  Unconnected households 
   
 
Source: Adapted from Banerjee and others, 2008 
 
An equally important question is whether tariffs would remain affordable if today’s tariffs were adjusted 
to allow for the recovery of full economic costs. For this purpose, we use two cost recovery benchmarks: 
the average historic cost and the Long Run Marginal Cost (table 9). 
Under historic cost recovery, a subsistence level of consumption of 50 kWh per month would range in 
cost from $3 to $16 a month. These monthly bills would on average be affordable for 72 percent of 
households  across  the  sample.  There  are  only  a  handful  of  countries  where  less  than  half  of  the 
population  could  afford  these  bills,  notably:  Niger  (7  percent),  Ethiopia  (12  percent),  Malawi  (43 
percent). 
If instead, a forward-looking Long Run Marginal Cost is used for cost recovery purposes, the results are 
very similar on average. Monthly bills would on average be affordable for 73 percent of households 
across the sample. However, the position of individual countries looks quite different.  For one group of 
countries (DRC, Malawi, Tanzania and to a lesser extent Benin and Kenya), LRMC based tariffs are 
significantly  more  affordable  than  historic  cost  recovery  tariffs.  For  a  second  group  of  countries 
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Table 9. Monthly power bill for subsistence consumption (50 kWh) 
 
Monthly bill  
($) 
Share of households that  
can afford the monthly bill (%) (*) 
 
Effective tariff  Historic cost  LRMC  Effective tariff 
Historic 
cost  LRMC 
Benin  6.31  9.92  9.50  95  68  72 
Burkina Faso  10.29  7.53  12.50  51  69  36 
Cameroon  4.30  8.56  3.50  100  100  100 
Cape Verde  11.81  8.95    100  100  — 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of  1.99  3.38  2.00  100  63  91 
Côte d’Ivoire  4.81  5.47  7.50  100  99  98 
Ethiopia  1.97  4.23  9.50  60  12  1 
Ghana  4.36  6.18  5.00  97  93  96 
Kenya  4.21  7.10  6.00  99  87  95 
Madagascar  2.98  7.49    92  55  — 
Malawi  2.39  4.54  2.50  92  43  91 
Niger  7.25  16.07  12.50  55  7  19 
Nigeria  1.25  4.84  6.50  97  84  74 
Senegal  9.31  5.77  21.50  100  100  — 
South Africa  —  2.98  3.00  100  100  100 
Tanzania  1.60  7.04  5.00  99  59  84 
Uganda  9.74  5.19  6.00  20  66  55 
Zambia  2.09  3.26  4.00  100  97  96 
             
Sub-Saharan African average        4.81         6.58        7.28         86.51        72.39       73.73  
Source: Adapted from Vennemo and Rosnes 2008 and Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power 
Tariff Database. 
Notes: See Annex 12 for further details 
(*) it is assumed that a bill is affordable if it is below 5 percent of the household budget. 
— Not available. 
A frequent argument used for not raising tariffs to full cost recovery levels is the potential impact on 
poverty. However, empirical evidence suggests that the immediate poverty-related effect of raising 
tariffs to cost-recovery levels is generally quite small, although it may have second-order effects. 
Detailed analysis of the effect of significant tariff increases of the order of 40 percent for power and 
water services in Senegal and power services in Mali confirms that the immediate poverty-related effect 
on consumers is small, essentially because very few poor consumers are connected to the service 
(Boccanfuso, Estache, and Savard 2008a; 2008b; 2008c). As the consequences of higher power or water 
prices work their way through the economy, however, broader second-order effects on wages and 
prices of goods in the economy as a whole can have a more substantial impact on poverty (Boccanfuso, 
Estache, and Savard 2008a; 2008b; 2008c). 
 
d.  Are power tariffs equitable?  
 
Notwithstanding these findings, most African countries subsidize tariffs for power. On average, power 
tariffs recover only 80 percent of costs. The resulting implicit subsidies amount to as much as $2.3 billion 
a  year  on  aggregate  (or  0.4  percent  of  Africa’s  GDP)  (Foster  and  Briceño-Garmendia  2009).  The 
aggregate burden of underpricing can be as much as 1–1.5 percent of a country’s GDP (as in Cameroon, 
the  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo,  Ghana,  Mali,  Malawi,  Nigeria,  South  Africa,  Tanzania,  Zambia, 32 
 
Uganda) and even higher (Botswana and Niger). From the utility’s perspective, underpricing can amount 
to losses valued as much (and even more than) 100 percent of the utility’s turnover (see annex 14 for 
details). 
Because electricity subsidies are typically justified by the need to make services affordable to low-
income households, a key question is whether subsidies reach such households. Results across a wide 
range of African countries show that the share of subsidies going to the poor is less than half their share 
of the population, indicating a very pro-rich distribution (figure 21). This result simply reflects the fact 
that connections to power are already highly skewed toward more affluent households. In SSA as a 
whole, access to power among the bottom three quintiles of the budget distribution is no more than 12 
percent on average compared to 72 percent in the top budget quintile. 
To put these results in perspective, one must compare them with the aims achieved by other forms of 
social  policy.  Estimates  for  Cameroon,  Gabon,  and  Guinea  indicate  that  expenditures  on  primary 
education and basic health care reach the poor better than do power and water subsidies (Wodon 2007) 
Figure 21. Extent to which electricity reaches the poor 
 
Sources: Banerjee and others 2008; Wodon 2007. 
Note: A measure of distributional incidence captures the share of subsidies received by the poor, divided by the 
proportion of the population in poverty. A value greater than 1 implies that the subsidy distribution is progressive 
(pro-poor), because the share of benefits allocated to the poor is larger than their share of the total population. A 
value less than 1 implies that the distribution is regressive (pro-rich). 
 
A  key  message is that power subsidies will always be highly regressive as long as access is highly 
regressive. The distributional  score presented above (figure 21) can be decomposed into access and 
subsidy design factors (figure 22). The access factor is related to the availability of electricity in the area 
where  the  household  lives  and  to  the  household’s  choice  to  connect  to  the  network  if  service  is 
available.  The  subsidy  design  factor  relates  to  who  is  targeted  to  receive  the  subsidies,  rates  of 
subsidization, and consumption levels. As for the overall distributional score, values higher (lower) than 
one for access and subsidy design factors are indications that those factors are progressive (regressive).  
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Figure 22. Access factors and subsidy design factors affecting targeting performance 
 
Source: Banerjee and others 2008. 
Note: Access factors capture the rates of connection among the poor to the network divided 
by the rates of connection to the population as a whole. Subsidy design factors are the ratio of 
the average benefit from the subsidy among all poor households connected to the network 
divided by the average benefit among all  households connected to the network. A  value 
greater than 1 implies that the factor distribution is progressive (pro-poor), because the share 
of benefits allocated to the poor is larger than their share in the total population. A value less 
than 1 implies that the distribution is regressive (pro-rich). 
 
In general the findings are that the subsidy design factor exceeds the access factor. As was to be 
expected, given the pattern of connections to power, the access factor is always less than one meaning 
highly regressive. The tariff factor, on the other hand, ranges from 0.4 (indicating a highly regressive 
tariff structure) and 1.6 (indicating a moderately progressive tariff structure). The most progressive tariff 
structures  are  found  in  DRC,  Gabon  and  Togo.  However,  for  the  bulk  of  countries  analyzed  are 
marginally  below  unity,  suggesting  that  the  tariff  structures  are  at  best  distributionally  neutral. 
However, this is not much of an achievement given that the intention behind the predominantly IBT 
tariff structures is to favor the poor. This finding is explained by the fact that the traditional IBTs that 
prevail in Africa tend to be poorly targeted because tariff structures subsidize consumption in the first 
blocks even for customers whose aggregate consumption is high. On top of that, the consumption 
threshold for the lower blocks tends to be too high to single out the poor, the price difference between 
blocks is not very large, and fixed charges are too high.
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How much are poor customers penalized by fixed charges and block structures? As noted above, over 50 
percent of the sample countries have incorporated fixed charges in their tariff schemes. Fixed charges in 
African countries range from US$0.43 cents to US$5.00 per month (figure 23a). Furthermore, these 
charges constitute a large portion of the aggregate monthly bill particularly at subsistence levels of 
consumption (figure 23b). At 50 kWh/month—subsistence consumption—the fixed charge represents 
more  than  40  percent  of  the  monthly  bill  in  over  30  percent of  the  countries.  At  higher  levels  of 
consumption—75kWh/month and 100 kWh/month—the weight of the fixed charge is less prominent. 
This indicates the disproportionate weight of the fixed charge in the bills of households consuming at 
the subsistence level.  
Figure 23. Fixed portion of residential tariffs 
a.  Residential fixed charge per month ($)  b.  Fixed charge as a share of monthly bill (%) 
   
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database. 
 
e.  Are there any other kinds of hidden subsidies? 
 
Besides  tariffs,  there  are  also  other  less  explicit  mechanisms  by  which  policy  makers  subsidize 
consumption. For instance, when policy makers overlook, tolerate, or even promote certain operational 
inefficiencies, they are in practice transferring resources from one sector of the economy to another, 
from the producer to the consumer, from future taxpayers to current customers, and so on.  
Tolerance of nonpayment is an implicit tax on utilities (and/or a transfer to consumer). Tolerance of 
pilferage—one of the main causes of transmission and distribution losses—is an implicit subsidy to 
customers and an implicit burden on future taxpayers. Acceptance and promotion of over-employment 
represents an untargeted transfer of resources from the utility to the society. These inefficiencies can be 
empirically quantified and prove to be substantial relative to GDP (Briceño-Garmendia, Foster, and Smits 
2008). For most countries, over-manning as well as collection inefficiencies amount to less than 0.2 
percent of GDP, whereas transmission and distribution losses tend to be much larger in value amounting 
to around 0.2-0.6 percent of GDP (figure 24a). These operational inefficiencies also look very large in 
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comparison with utility revenues; amounting to between 20 and 60 percent of utility revenues in most 
cases, and exceeding 100 percent of utility revenues in a few cases (figure 24b).  
In countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Namibia, and 
Cameroon—to name only a few—transmission and distribution losses (technical and nontechnical) are 
the lead cause of hidden losses (figure 24b). In Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Ghana, Uganda, and Botswana—to 
cite some examples—under-collection of bills is the main offender, though it is observed that unpaid 
bills are from the government or other public enterprises. Finally, over-manning seems to be an issue for 
countries such as Cape Verde and Chad. 
Figure 24. Monetary costs of overlooked inefficiencies 
a. % of GDP  b. % of revenue 
 
 
Source: Briceño-Garmendia, Foster, and Smits 2008 
 
In fact it is not infrequent that the financial burden of the myriad operational inefficiencies is higher 
than  the  cost  of  subsidizing  via  under-pricing.  In  about  half  of  the  countries  in  our  sample,  the 
magnitude of these operational inefficiencies is higher than the magnitude of price subsidies (figure 25). 
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Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database. 
 
Overall, how would we rate Sub-Saharan African power tariffs? 
 
A scorecard combining four of the key goals in the design of power tariffs—cost recovery, efficiency, 
equity  and  affordability—illustrates  the  challenges  of  simultaneously  achieving  these  sometimes 
conflicting  objectives.  For  each  of  these  objectives  a  quantitative  indicator  is  used  based  on  the 
foregoing analysis. Cost recovery is measured as the ratio of the current average effective tariff to the 
average historic cost of power production. Efficiency is measured as the ratio of the current average 
effective tariff to the Long Run Marginal Cost of power production. Affordability is measured as the 
percentage  of  households  that  are  able  to  purchase  a  subsistence  level  of  consumption  of  50 
kWh/month at the prevailing average effective tariff without spending more than 5 percent of their 
household budgets. Equity is measured as the share of the subsidy captured by households living under 
the poverty line divided by the percentage of households in the population that live under the poverty 
line. 
The analysis shows that the average scores for the sample are 78 percent for cost recovery, 82 percent 
for efficiency, and 87 percent for affordability. And for equity the average score is 0.29 indicating a 
highly  regressive  distributional  incidence,  relative  to  a  score  of  1.00  for  a  tariff  that  is  neutral  in 
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Table 10: Scorecard for performance of country’s power tariffs against four key policy objectives 
Objective  Cost Recovery  Efficiency  Affordability  Equity 
Indicator  Ratio of                        
average effective 
tariff to average 
historic cost 
Ratio of average 
effective tariff to 
LRMC 
Share of population that 
can afford subsistence 
consumption priced at 
average effective tariff 
Percentage of subsidy 
captured by poor as a 
ration of percentage of 
poor in the population 
Benin                        0.72                     0.75                     0.95    
Botswana                        0.54                     1.00             0.06  
Burkina Faso                        1.00                     0.87                     0.51    
Cameroon                        0.63                     1.00                    1.00            0.36  
Cape Verde                        1.00                       1.00            0.48  
Chad                        1.00                     1.00             0.06  
Congo, Dem. Rep. of                        0.59                     1.00                     1.00            0.62  
Congo                        0.80   1.00     
Cote d'Ivoire  1.00                      0.91                     1.00            0.51  
Ethiopia                        0.76                     0.40                     0.60    
Ghana                        0.81                     1.00                     0.97            0.31  
Kenya  1.00                    1.00                    0.99    
Lesotho                        0.79                     1.00     
Madagascar                        0.93                       0.92    
Malawi                        0.62                     1.00                      0.92    
Mali                        0.79                     0.95      
Mozambique                        0.87                     1.00             0.31  
Namibia  1.00                    0.97      
Niger                        0.44                     0.47                     0.55    
Nigeria                        0.44                     0.32                     0.97    
Rwanda                        0.88                     1.00             0.01  
Senegal                        1.00                    0.35                     1.00    
South Africa                        0.84                     0.72                     1.00            0.41  
Sudan         
Tanzania                        0.52                     0.91                     0.99    
Uganda                        1.00                    1.00                    0.20            0.02  
Zambia                        0.44                     0.36                     1.00    
Zimbabwe                      0.47      
Average                     0.78                     0.82                            0.87                            0.29  
Source: Derived from Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database. 
 
What becomes immediately clear is that some countries rank very high for cost recovery but do very 
poorly for equity and affordability and vice versa (table 11). Countries such as Chad, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, and Uganda tend to rank well for cost recovery but poorly for affordability and equity. On the 
other end, countries such as South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, and Zambia fare 
relatively well in terms of equity and affordability but have not been able to achieve cost recovery. What 
is striking is that achieving all four objective simultaneously is almost impossible in the context of the 
high-cost low-income environment that characterizes much of SSA today. Hence most countries are 
caught between cost recovery and affordability.   38 
 
Table 11. Overview of scorecard results 
  Target fully achieved  Performs above the median 
Cost 
recovery 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Kenya, Namibia, Senegal, Uganda 
 
Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, 
South Africa, 
Efficiency  Chad, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, Botswana, Cameroon, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Congo, Rep. of 
Namibia, Congo, Dem. Rep. of 
Affordability  Senegal, Cameroon, Cape Verde, South Africa, 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 
 
Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Côte d’Ivoire 
Equity  None 
 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, South Africa, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Congo, Dem. Rep. of 
 
Source: Derived from Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database. 
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Annex 1. Country coverage, country classification, and year of tariff schedule data set 
  
Economic/CPIA 


























































































































Benin        1         1  1        1  2003 
Botswana    1           1    1        1  2008 
Burkina Faso        1         1  1        1  2006 
Cameroon  1         1          1    1    2003 
Cape Verde    1             1  1        1  2006 
Chad  1         1        1        1  2005 
Congo, Rep. of  1         1        1      1    2007 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of      1         1        1  1    2005 
Côte d’Ivoire      1           1      1  1    2006 
Ethiopia        1     1        1    1    2004 
Ghana        1         1      1  1    2006 
Kenya        1     1          1  1    2006 
Lesotho    1           1    1      1    2006 
Madagascar        1             1      1  2005 
Malawi        1       1      1    1    2006 
Mali        1         1    1    1    2008 
Mozambique        1       1        1  1    2006 
Namibia     1           1      1    1    2006 
Niger         1           1        1  2003 
Nigeria   1               1      1    1  2005 
Rwanda        1     1      1      1    2005 
Senegal         1         1    1      1  2006 
Seychelles    1               1        1  2006 
Sudan   1           1        1      1  2003 
Tanzania        1     1        1    1    2006 
Uganda        1     1        1    1    2006 
Zambia  1             1        1  1    2005 
Zimbabwe      1         1        1    1  2008Dec 
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database. 
Note: LIC = low-income country; MIC = middle-income country; CAPP = Central Africa Power Pool; EAPP = East 
African Power Pool; SAPP = Southern African Power Pool; WAPP = West African Power Pool.  
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Benin  IBT  no  no              3  <20  20  56      0.096  
                   20–200  200  85       0.146  
                     >200    95       0.163  
Botswana  FR  11.11     1.63         no     1        0.4        0.06  
Burkina Faso  IBT      582   1.11              3  <=50  50  96       0.184  
                   >50–200  200  102       0.195  
                           >200     109      0.208  
Cameroon*   IBT*    no          3  <=50  50  50      0.086  
                   50–200  200  60/67       0.109  
                   >200    65/75       0.120  
Cape Verde  IBT  no  no              2  <=40  40  20       0.225  
                     >40    25      0.280  
Chad  IBT  no  no              3  <=30  30  83       0.157  
                   ?? 30–60  60  177      0.336  
                   ?? >60    201       0.381  
Congo, Dem. Rep. of**  IBT  no  no              11  <=100  100  —      0.040  
                   >100–200  200  —      0.039  
                   >200–300  300  —      0.039  
                   >300–400  400  —      0.039  
                   >400–500  500  —      0.038  
                   >500–600  600  —      0.038  
                   <=600  600  —      0.089  
                   >600–800  800  —      0.088  
                   >800–
1,000  1,000  —       0.087  
                   >1,000–
1,200  1,200  —      0.086  
                           >1,200     —       0.085  
Congo, Rep. of  FR  2,268  5.06        no     1        49.08         0.11  
Côte d’Ivoire  IBT  333  0.64          2  <=40  40  36      0.069  
                   >40    74       0.142  
Ethiopia***  IBT           cons levels for fixed charge  7  <=50  50  0.27      0.032  
         1.40   0.16    0–25        >50–100  100  0.36       0.041  
        3.40   0.39    26–50        >50–100  100  0.50       0.058  
        3.82   0.44    51–105        >100–200  200  0.55      0.064  
        10.24   1.19    105–300        >200–300  300  0.57      0.066  
        13.65   1.58    301+        >300–400  400  0.59      0.068  
                           >400     0.69      0.080  
Ghana  IBT    5,000     0.54           3  <=300  300         700        0.076  
                   >300–700  700        1,200        0.131  
                     >700          1,400        0.153  
Kenya 2000  IBT  75  1.04              4  <=50  50  1.6       0.021  
                   >50=300  300  6.7      0.092  
                  
>300–
3,000  3,000  7.0       0.097  
                          
>3,000–
7,000  7,000  13.8       0.191  
Kenya adjusted  IBT  n.a.  1.74          4  <=50  50  n.a.      0.049  
                   >50=300  300  n.a.       0.212  
                  
>300–
3,000  3,000  n.a.      0.223  
                  
>3,000–
7,000  7,000  n.a.      0.440  
Kenya 2008     120.00  1.74                 <=50  50  2      0.029  
                   >50=1,500  1500  8.1        0.117  
                           >1,500     18.57      0.269  
Lesotho  FR  no  no              1        0.49       0.072  
Madagascar  FR    5,962   2.98          1      152       0.076  
Malawi                                     
billing  IBT  124.71  0.92          3  <=30  30  2.7      0.020  
                   >30–750  750  3.9      0.029  
                           >750     5.6       0.041  
prepayment  FR  no  no          1      4.2       0.031  
Malawi 2009                                     
billing  IBT  124.71     1.05             <=30  30  2.7      0.023  




























































































































































































































































                   >750    5.6       0.047  
                                      
prepayment  FR  no  no                       4.2481        0.04  
Mali  IBT  no  no              4  <=200  200  119        0.27  
                   >200    139        0.31  
Mozambique                                     
billling  IBT   70,799   2.79          4  >=100  100        1,010       0.040  
                   100–200  200        2,198        0.087  
                   >200–500  500       2,929         0.115  
                     >500          3,077        0.121  
prepayment  FR  no  no              1           2,802.0        0.110  
Namibia  FR  no  no              1        0.79        0.117  
Niger  FR  250  0.43              1        79.25       0.136  
Nigeria***   IBT  20  0.15  <5  1,084.1        5  <20  20  1.2      0.009  
     30  0.23  >5–15  3,252.2        >20–60  60  4      0.030  
     120  0.91  >15–45  9,756.5        >60–180  180  6      0.046  
       5,000   38.09  >45–500  108,405       
>180–
2,000  2,000  8.5       0.065  
        31,250   238.06 
>500–
20,000             
>2,000–
80,000  80,000  8.5       0.065  
Rwanda  FR  no  no              1        81.25       0.146  
Senegal                                     
UDS, special domestic customers (poor)  no  no          3  >20    95.48       0.183  
                   20–44    106.55      0.204  
                           >44     62       0.119  
UDG, general domestic 
customers  VDT   no   no          3  >20  20  120      0.230  
                   20–44  44  87        0.17  
                   >44    62       0.119  
Senegal 2008  IBT  no  no                 <150  150  106      0.238  
                   151–250  250  114       0.255  
                           >250     117      0.262  
South Africa  IBT  no  no              2  <=50  50           —          — 
                           >50           0.49        0.072  
Tanzania****  IBT                        
low usage                2    50  40      0.032  
                       128       0.102  
general usage  FR  1,892.00  1.51     >=275              >=275  106       0.085  
Tanzania 2008  IBT                                  
low usage                2    50  49       0.041  
                       156       0.130  
general usage  FR  2,303.00  1.93    >=275          >=275  129       0.108  
                                      
Uganda  IBT    2,000   1.09              2  <=15  15  62      0.034  
                           >15     426      0.233  
Zambia  IBT     5,845   1.31          3  >=300  300  70       0.016  
                   <300–700  700  100      0.022  
                           >700     163       0.037  
Zimbabwe  IBT                    3  <50  50  29,289.15        0.01  
                   51–500  500  389,020.02        0.08  
                           >500     661,469.58        0.13  
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database. 
Note: kVa = kilowatt-ampere, LCU = [[?]], kWh = kilowatt-hour, IBT = increasing block tariff,  FR = [[?]], UDG= [[?]],  UDS= [[?]],  VDT= [[?]]. 
* Cameroon: Each price applies to all consumed within the corresponding consumption range, as in tariff 1 = unit price if cons<50; tariff 2 = unit price if 50<cons<200; tariff 3 = unit price if 
cons>200; second tariff is dry-season tariff, dry season is from January to June. 
*** Ethiopia: Consumption levels for fixed charge: 0–25, 26–50, 51–105, 105–300, 301+ kWh. 
**** Nigeria: Consumption levels for fixed charge: <5, >5–15, >15–45, >45–500, >500–20,000 kVa. 
***** Tanzania: General usage fixed charge is applicable if consumption reaches or exceeds 275 kWh/month and is not charged below it. 
** Congo, Dem. Rep. of: According to a Project Appraisal Document of 2007, average residential tariff in 2005 was 1.2 cents/kWh; collected revenue was 0.4 cents. Tariff was increased early 
2007 by 50 percent to 1.7 cents/kWh. 
n.a. Not applicable. 





































































































































































































































































































































Benin  FR                       1         88.00   0.15 
Botswana  FR              30     4.36            1          0.46   0.07 
Burkina Faso  TOU            1,169     2.24      2,882  
   
5.51  
 
0.023   2  (10 am–2 pm and 4 pm–7 pm)     165.00   0.32 
                    
(12 am–10 am/2 pm–4 pm/7 
pm–12 am)      88.00   0.17 
Cameroon*  DBT                 2,000     3.44  
  
0.013   2 
180 kWh/kVa of subscribed 
load   63/68   0.11 
                    
>1,801 kWh/kVa of subscribed 
load   55/60   0.10 
Cape Verde  FR                       1         19.20   0.22 




0.056   3  <=30      84.00   0.16 
                     ???30–60     186.00   0.35 
                              ???>60 
    
211.00   0.40 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. of  DBT                5  200    0.111 
                     500    0.11 
                     1,000    0.109 
                     1,500    0.108 
                     >1,500    0.107 
Congo, Rep. of  FR            3,972  
   
8.87            1         43.56   0.10 
Côte d'Ivoire  DBT            1,882     3.60            2  <=180 * kVa bimonthly      97.09   0.19 
                              >180 * kVa bimonthly      83.25   0.16 
Ethiopia  TOU            122  
  
14.12         3  equivalent flat rate       0.58        0.067  
                     peak hour       0.74        0.086  
                     off-peak hour       0.54        0.063  
Ghana  IBT          25,000  
   
2.72            3  300 
 
1,020.00   0.11 
                     600 
  
1,250.00   0.14 
                     >600 
  
1,450.00   0.16 
Kenya  FR              150     2.08            1  >7,000       6.70   0.09 
Kenya 
adjusted            n.a.  
   
3.47            1      n.a.   0.21 




0.081   1         0.08   0.012 
Madagascar  FR       
   
101,271  
  
50.56     13,370     6.67  
 
0.027   1        338.44   0.169 
Malawi  FR            1,509  
   
11.10        961     7.07  
 
0.026   1          4.09   0.03 
Malawi 2009               1,509                          
Mali                                   104.00   0.23 
Mozambique  FR       
 
207,308  




   
4.17  
  
0.017   1    
  
1,378.00   0.05 
Namibia  FR               75  
  




0.044   1           0.57   0.08 
Niger  FR            1,500  
   
2.58      1,000  
   
1.72  
 

































































































































































































































































































































Nigeria   IBT  5–15     3,252         90     0.69            4          6.50   0.05 
     15–45     9,756         120  
   
0.91                  8.50   0.06 




108,405        240  
   
1.83                  8.50   0.06 
     
500–
2,000    80,000              250     1.90  
 
0.007              8.50   0.06 
Rwanda  FR                       1         95.88   0.17 
Senegal  TOU           4,023     8.98            2  regular hours      88.84   0.20 
                              peak hour 
    
142.15   0.32 
South Africa  IBT  <=25     5,420        227  
 
33.58            3          0.27   0.04 
     25–50 
   
10,841        276  
 
40.80                  0.27   0.04 
    
50–
100 
   
21,681        430  
 
63.53                  0.27   0.04 
   FR  <=25     5,420    no               1          0.64   0.09 
Tanzania  FR          6,615  
   
5.28      7,245     5.79  
  
0.021   1        66.00   0.05 
Uganda  TOU           2,000  
   
1.09            1        398.80   0.22 
Zambia  FR  15       29,227  
   
6.55            1        163.00   0.04 
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database. 
Note: TOU = time-of-use tariff; DBT = decreasing block tariff. 
*Cameroon: fixed charge is 2,500 per kilowatt if subscribed load is up to 200 hours and 4,200 per kilowatt if it is above 200 hours; second tariff is dry-season tariff, dry season is from January 
to June. 

































































































































































































































































































































































Benin  FR                          1    
       
62.00   0.107 
Botswana          
               
30  
        
4.36   59 
        
8.61  
       
86.11  
              
861   1    
           
0.21  
             
0.03  
Burkina Faso  TOU       
          
1,050  
         
2.01  
      
5,962  
       
11.40  
    
114.02  
            
1,140   2 
(10am–2pm & 4pm–
7pm) 
       
118.00   0.226 
                      
(12am–10am/2pm–
4pm/7pm–12am) 
        
54.00   0.103 
Cameroon  TOU 
>200 
hours    
             
108  
         
0.19  
      
2,778  
        
4.78  
      
47.79  
              
478   2  (11pm-6pm) 
 
40/61.25   0.087 
                                 (6pm-11pm)   40/50   0.085 
Cape Verde  FR                          1    
         
15.60   0.177 
Chad  TOU         
      
8,055  
            
15  
     
152.71  
            
1,527   3  regular hours 
      
108.00   0.205 
                       night hours      
                                 peak hours 
     
200.00   0.379 
Congo (DRC)  DBT                  5  200    0.152 
                       500    0.150 
                                         1,000     0.149 
                                          1,500     0.148 
                        >1500     0.146 
Congo, Rep.  FR       
          
1,260  
         
2.81   15 
       
0.03  
        
0.35  
                  
3   1    
         
50.16  
               
0.11  
Côte d'Ivoire  TOU       
         
3,303  
        
6.32               3 
(7:30am–7:30pm, 
11pm–12am) 
          
55.71   0.107 
                       (7:30pm–11pm) 
         
75.95   0.144 
                                  (11pm–7:30am) 
       
46.09   0.088 
Ethiopia  TOU     
              
116  
      
13.39           3  equiv. flat rate 
           
0.41   0.047 
                       peak hour 
           
0.51   0.059 
                       off-peak hour 
          
0.39   0.046 
Ghana  FR       
     
125,000  
      
13.62  
   
90,000  
        
9.81  
      
98.10  
              
981   1    
     
500.00   0.054 
Kenya  DBT     240-415 
            
600  
        
8.32  
         
300  
        
4.16  
       
41.61  
              
416   3    
           
5.16   0.072 
      
11,000-
33,000 
         
2,000  
      
27.74  
         
200  
        
2.77          
          
4.60   0.064 
      
66,000-
132,000 
          
7,500  
    
104.02  
          
100  
        
1.39          
          
4.40   0.061 
Kenya adjusted         nap  
      
13.90    nap  
        
6.95  
     
69.49  
             
463   3     nap   0.164 
          nap  
     
46.32    nap  
       
4.63            nap   0.147 
             nap  
     
173.72    nap  
       
2.32                nap   0.140 
Lesotho  FR             
          
147  
      
21.76  
    
217.58  
           
2,176   1    
          
0.07   0.011 
Madagascar  FR       
   
1,137,264  
     
567.77     
            
—   
            
—   
                 
—     1    
      
199.00   0.099 
Malawi  FR       
           
1,455  
       
10.70  
         
899  
        
6.61  
     
66.06  
              
661   1    
          
3.28   0.024 
Mali  TOU        
           
1,471  
        
3.28               1    
         
75.75   0.169 
Mozambique  FR     
     
973,079  
      
38.31  
   
131,794  
         
5.19  
      
51.89  
               
519   1   
   
1,144.00   0.045 
Namibia 
(Nampower)  FR       
            
324  
      
47.85  
            
75  
       
11.04  
    
110.36  
            
1,104   1    
          



























































































































































































































































































































































Niger  FR       
        
15,000  
       
25.81  
      
2,778  
        
4.78  
      
47.79  
              
478   1    
         
51.22   0.088 
Nigeria   IBT  5-15    
               
90  
        
0.69           
               
175   5    
          
6.50   0.050 
     15-45   
             
120  
         
0.91              
          
8.50   0.065 
     55-500   
            
240  
         
1.83   230 
         
1.75          
          
8.50   0.065 
    
500-
2000        250 
        
1.90          
          
8.50   0.065 
      >2000           270 
       
2.06              
          
8.50   0.065 
Rwanda  FR                          1    
        
95.88   0.172 
Senegal  TOU       
          
9,855  
      
22.01               2    
         
58.01   0.130 
                                   
        
83.54   0.187 
South Africa  TOU  <=100    
              
159  
     
23.48   6.74 
        
1.00  
        
9.95  
              
100   2  June-August 
           
0.18   0.026 
    
100-
500   
             
547  
      
80.72   6.74 
        
1.00         Sept-May 
           
0.12   0.018 
    
500-
1000   
           
3,131  
   
462.30   6.74 
        
1.00               
      >1000    
           
3,131  
   
462.30   6.74 
        
1.00                    
Tanzania  FR     
          
7,012  
        
5.60  
       
7,123  
        
5.69  
     
56.90  
              
569   1   
        
61.00   0.049 
Uganda  TOU       
      
20,000  
      
10.92   5000 
        
2.73  
     
27.30  
              
273   1    
     
369.70   0.167 
Zambia  DBT  16-300    
       
78,002  
       
17.48  
     
6,943  
         
1.56  
       
15.56  
              
291   4                    1,200  
      
100.00   0.022 
    
300-
2000   
     
136,003  
      
30.47  
    
12,990  
        
2.91                          8,000  
        
85.00   0.019 
    
2000-
7500   
    
272,006  
     
60.94  
     
19,587  
       
4.39                        30,000  
       
63.00   0.014 
      >7500    
     
544,012  
     
121.88  
    
19,696  
        
4.41              
        
52.00   0.012 
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database. 
n.a. Not applicable. 
— Not available. 
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Annex 5. Representative schedule used in calculations 
   Residential  Commercial  Industrial  Social  Public lighting 














The first 20 kWh 
within tarif 




publique (BT3) (client 
categorie: 
municipalites) 
Botswana  TOU 4 domestic  TOU 6 small business  TOU 8 large business  n.a.  — 
Burkina Faso  Basse tension, 





type B (monophase) 
Basse tension, double 
tarif, categorie: Tarifs 
horaires particuliers 
et administration, 






tarif type E2 
(industrial) 
No tariff named 
“social.” Used the 
following tariff as 
social: Basse tension, 





type A (monophase) 
Tariff type F: Eclairage 
public 




MV tariffs  No tariff titled 
"social." Used first 
tranche residential as 
social. 
No such tariff in the 
schedule 
Cape Verde  BT: low voltage   BT Especial: low 
voltage special 
MT: medium voltage  No tariff titled 
"social." Used first 




Chad  Basse tension, Usage 
domestique (I.1.a). 





No tariff titled 
"social." Used first 




Congo, Dem. Rep. of  Clients avec 
compteur, clients 
basse tension, 








basse tension, force 
motrice 






Congo, Rep. of  Tarifs en basse 
tension, T1, Mono, 
puisance souscrite 
(kW): 1,2. 
Tarifs en basse 
tension, T7-1, Tri-
phase, puisance 
souscrite (kW): 12. 
Tarifs en moyenne 




n.a.  — 
Côte d'Ivoire  Basse tension, tarif 
modere domestique 
Basse tension, tarif 
general professionnel 
Moyenne et haute 
tensions, tarif general  
No tariff titled 
"social." Used first 
tranche residential as 
social. 
Tarif eclairage public 
Ethiopia  Residential category, 
single phase 
Nonresidential 
category: LV industry 
three-phase 
Nonresidential 
category: HV industry 
@ 15 KV three-phase 
No tariff titled 
"social." Used first 
tranche residential as 
social. 
Nonresidential 
category: three phase 
street lighting 
Ghana  Third schedule, tariff 
category: residential 
Third schedule, tariff 
category: 
nonresidential 
Third schedule, tariff 
category: SLT-MV 
(special load tariff - 
medium voltage) 
No tariff titled 
"social." Used first 
tranche residential as 
social. 
— 
Kenya 2000  Tariff A0 Domestic  Tariff A1 Small 
commercial and 
industrial 




No tariff titled 
"social." Used first 
tranche residential as 
social. 
Tariff E Street lighting 
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   Residential  Commercial  Industrial  Social  Public lighting 
Madagascar  Basse tension, BT 
generale (average of 
zones 1 to 3) 
Moyenne tension, MT 
horaire (average of 
zones 1 to 3) 
HAute tension, HT 
horaire (average of 
zones 1 to 3) 
Basse tension, BT 
economique (average 
of zones 1 to 3) 
— 
Malawi  Scale 1, Metering 
type: billing, domestic 
tariff 












     
Mali  Tarification nationale 
basse tension, Tarif 
normal (compteurs 2 
fils> 5 amperes et 








Tarif binome horaire 
Tarification nationale 
basse tension, Tarif 
social (compteurs 2 
fils 5 amperes) 
Tarification nationale 
basse tension, Tarif 
eclairage public  
Mozambique  Domestic, customers 
with conventional 
meters 
LV large customers  MV customers  Used "tarifa sociale," 
which coincides with 
the first tranche of 
the domestic tariff. 
— 
Namibia  Nored, prepaid  Nored, business 
single phase 
Nored, business three 
phase 
n.a.  Nored, streetlights 
Niger  Basse tension, 
Unique: Electricite 
usage domestique, 





average of K22 and 
K23  
—  Basse tension, 
Unique: K34 
Nigeria  Residential category, 
single phase 
Commercial  Industrial  No tariff titled 




South Africa  Homelight (for low-
usage residential 
customers in urban 
areas), Homelight 1, 
prepaid (first 50 kWh 
free) 
Business rate (for 
small businesses in 
urban areas, up to 
100 kVa), Business 
rate 1 
Miniflex (TOU for 
urban customers 
from 25 kVa to 5 MVa 
No tariff titled 
"social." Used first 
tranche residential 
(free of charge) as 
social. 
Public lighting 
Senegal  Tarif UP2  Tarif moyenne 
tension, Tarif General 
(TG) 
Tarif moyenne 
tension, Tarif Longue 
Utilization (TLU) 
n.a.  Eclairage Public BT 
Tanzania  Domestic low-usage 
tariff (D1) (for up to 
50 kWh) and general-
usage tariff (T1) (for 










Uganda  Code 10.2/10.3: Low 
voltage supply for 
small general services 
(domestic) 
Code 10.2/10.3: Low 
voltage supply for 
small general services 
(commercial) 
Code 20: Low voltage 
supply for medium 
scale industries 
No tariff titled 
"social." Used first 
tranche residential as 
social. 
Code 50: Street 
lighting 
Zambia  Metered residential 
tariffs (capacity 15 
kVa) 
Commercial tariffs 
(capacity 15 kVa) 
Maximum demand 
tariffs, MD2—
capacity 301 to 2000 
kVa 
No tariff titled 
"social." Used first 
tranche residential as 
social. 
Street lighting 
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database. 
Note: LV = low voltage, MV = medium voltage, BT = basse tension o baixa tensao, MT = moyen tension, KVa= kilovolt, HV = high voltage,  MVa = 
megavolt. 
n.a. Not applicable. 
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Annex 6. Methodological notes and inputs for historic cost calculation 
Calculating the historical capital costs of generation 
 
Step 1. Calculations are based on generation unit overnight investment costs per kilowatt. For oil-, coal-, 
and  gas-based  production,  internationally  accepted  unit  overnight  investment  costs  ($/kW)
9  are 
assumed. For hydroproduction, country-specific unit costs calculated as weighted averages
10 of unit 
costs for hydropower projects in each country are applied.
11 
 
Step 2. Unit costs are discounted using the annualization factor assuming a 10 percent discount rate and 
a standard expected lifetime of the power plant, which differs depending on the type of generation.
12 
 
Step 3.  Unit  generation  investment  cost  per  kilowatt  for  each  country  is  calculated  considering  the 
country-specific generation mix (percentage of each type of generation in total) and discounted unit 
costs produced at step 2. 
 
Step  4.  Capital  costs  of  generation  per  kilowatt-hour  are  calculated  by  multiplying  country-specific 
discounted unit costs (step 3) by the country’s generation capacity and dividing by the country’s power 
generation.  
 
Calculation of historical capital costs of transmission and distribution 
 
Step 1. A proxy used for total lifetime investment is the overnight transmission and distribution (T&D) 
investment calculated under the assumption of constant 2005 access to power.
13,14  
 
Step 2. Since the scenario of constant 2005 access was run for the “trade expansion” option only, an 
adjustment is made to exclude the cost of the new cross-border transmission lines. This was done using 
the annualized cross-border investment as a share of the total.  
 
Step 3. Since constant 2005 access rates in the investment needs model is applied to the population in 
2015, we adjusted the denominator (generation 2005) using—as a proxy for the generation increase—
growth in the number of households between 2005 and 2015. Then we applied the annualization factor 
to come out with the present value of required annual future T&D investment per kilowatt-hour. 
   
                                                           
9 Source of the unit costs: AICD, BP5 (Investment Needs Paper); original sources: International Energy Agency, 
Energy Information Administration (United States), Royal Academy of Engineering (United Kingdom). 
10 Weighted by plant capacity. 
11 Source of unit costs for hydropower projects: AICD, BP5 (Investment Needs Paper). 
12 For hydroplants, the assumed lifetime is 50 years; for coal plants, 25 years; and for oil and gas plants, 30 years. 
13 With population growth, the number of people with access to power is increasing under this scenario, although 
the percentage of population with access is constant. 
14 Source: AICD, BP5 (Investment Needs Paper). 51 
 
 
Annex 7. Inputs for calculating historical costs 
  Unit costs 
($/MW) 
  Economic 
lifetime 
(years) 
   Discount rate  10%    
Generation          
Hydro 
Country 
specific     50 
           
Coal  1,100     25 
Gas  670     30 
Oil  810     30 
Transmission 
Country 
specific     40 
           
Distribution        40 
Sources: Rosnes and Vennemo, 2008 
Note: MW = megawatt. 
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Generation investment unit 


































































































































































































































































Angola  830  3,722  126  4  810  670  1,100  1,966  5  9       
Benin *  60  124  23  3  810  670  1,100  4,671  5  8  12  20 
Botswana  132  631  15  1  810  670  1,100  1,496  1  2  12  14 
Burkina Faso   236  516  15  2  810  670  1,100  4,767  8  11  4  15 
Burundi  37  92  6  3  810  670  1,100  3,476  11  14       
Cameroon   875  4,004  53  1  810  670  1,100  1,428  3  4  13  17 
Cape Verde *  80  250  1  1  810  670  1,100  3,356  3  4  14  18 
Central African 
Republic  40  115  1  1  810  670  1,100  1,500  4  5       
Chad   29  117  2  2  810  670  1,100  1,568  3  4  9  14 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of  2,443  7,193  46  1  810  670  1,100  644  2  3  4  7 
Congo, Rep. of  121  400  10  2  810  670  1,100  1,775  5  7  13  20 
Côte d'Ivoire   1,084  5,524  61  2  810  670  1,100  2,283  3  4  7  11 
Equatorial Guinea   13  28  1  2  810  670  1,100  2,292  6  7       
Ethiopia  814  2,589  111  4  810  670  1,100  1,016  3  6  2  8 
Gabon   415  1,774  6  0  810  670  1,100  3,356  5  6       
Gambia   30  160  5  3  810  670  1,100  3,356  2  4       
Ghana   1,490  6,750  103  2  810  670  1,100  2,098  3  5  8  12 
Guinea   274  850  14  1  810  670  1,100  1,547  4  6       
Guinea-Bissau   21  65  1  1  810  670  1,100  4,100  3  4       
Kenya  1,312  5,347  96  2  810  670  1,100  2,889  4  6  8  14 
Lesotho  76  410  5  1  810  670  1,100  1,938  3  4  6  11 
Liberia   188  350  4  1  810  670  1,100  4,158  5  6       
Madagascar  227  973  20  2  810  670  1,100  1,496  3  4  11  15 
Malawi  285  1,368  10  1  810  670  1,100  1,488  3  3  6  9 
Mali   280  515  29  5  810  670  1,100  3,225  12  17  16  34 
Mauritius  688  2,321  13  1  810  670  1,100  1,496  2  3       
Mozambique*  2,383  15,914  25  0  810  670  1,100  1,432  3  3  6  9 
Namibia  264  1,580  57  2  810  670  1,100  1,778  2  4  7  11 
Niger   145  202  7  1  810  670  1,100  3,356  8  9  23  32 
Nigeria   5,898  24,079  1,132  5  810  670  1,100  1,222  2  7  2  10 
Rwanda  39  116  13  4  810  670  1,100  1,930  5  10  7  17 
Senegal   509  2,105  231  2  810  670  1,100  3,356  3  6  19  25 
Sierra Leone   50  80  15  2  810  670  1,100  3,089  8  11       
South Africa  41,904  228,071  981  0  810  670  1,100  1,496  2  3  3  6 
Sudan  961  4,341  92  3  810  670  1,100  2,509  3  6       
Tanzania  919  1,880  44  2  810  670  1,100  1,957  4  6  8  14 
Togo   85  230  8  1  810  670  1,100  2,387  10  11       
Uganda  303  1,893  35  2  810  670  1,100  2,377  4  5  5  10 
Zambia  1,700  8,850  43  0  810  670  1,100  1,336  2  3  4  7 
Zimbabwe  2,099  8,890  61  0  810  670  1,100  1,386  3  3       
Sources: Rosnes and Vennemo, 2008   Note: GWh = gigawatt-hour 53 
 











cost  Total cost  
Angola  4.4  4.8  9.2       
Benin*  3.1  5.1  8.2  11.6  19.8 
Botswana  0.6  1.4  2.0  11.9  13.9 
Burkina Faso   2.3  8.4  10.7  4.4  15.1 
Burundi  3.2  11.1  14.3       
Cameroon   1.3  3.1  4.4  12.7  17.1 
Cape Verde*  0.5  3.1  3.6  14.3  17.9 
Central African 
Republic  1.0  4.3  5.3       
Chad   1.6  2.7  4.2  9.4  13.7 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of  0.7  2.2  2.9  3.9  6.8 
Congo, Rep. of  1.8  4.9  6.7  13.4  20.1 
Côte d’Ivoire   1.6  2.8  4.4  6.6  10.9 
Equatorial Guinea   1.7  5.7  7.4       
Ethiopia  3.5  2.9  6.4  2.1  8.5 
Gabon   0.4  5.4  5.7       
Gambia   2.5  1.7  4.2       
Ghana   1.5  3.3  4.8  7.5  12.4 
Guinea   1.5  4.3  5.8       
Guinea-Bissau   1.0  3.0  4.0       
Kenya  1.5  4.3  5.8  8.4  14.2 
Lesotho  1.2  3.2  4.5  6.4  10.8 
Liberia   0.9  5.1  6.0       
Madagascar  1.7  2.8  4.5  10.5  15.0 
Malawi  0.6  2.6  3.2  5.9  9.1 
Mali   5.1  12.2  17.3  16.3  33.6 
Mauritius  0.6  2.0  2.6       
Mozambique*  0.2  2.5  2.8  6.3  9.0 
Namibia  1.7  2.4  4.0  7.3  11.3 
Niger   1.1  7.7  8.8  23.4  32.1 
Nigeria   5.3  2.2  7.5  2.2  9.7 
Rwanda  4.4  5.5  9.8  6.8  16.6 
Senegal   2.2  3.4  5.6  19.4  25.0 
Sierra Leone   2.2  8.5  10.7       
South Africa  0.5  2.1  2.6  3.4  6.0 
Sudan  2.6  2.9  5.5       
Tanzania  1.8  4.3  6.1  8.0  14.1 
Togo   1.0  9.7  10.7       
Uganda  1.6  3.5  5.1  5.3  10.4 
Zambia  0.4  2.5  2.9  3.6  6.5 
Zimbabwe  0.5  2.9  3.4       
Sources: Rosnes and Vennemo, 2008 
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Annex 9. Value and volume of sales to residential customers as percentage of total  
  
Share of residential 
sales (LCU) in total 
Share of residential supply 
(GWh) in total     
Benin     48.7     
Burkina Faso   63  63.1     
Cameroon   60  32.8     
Cape Verde   56.2  49.7     
Chad   67  63.5     
Congo, Dem. Rep. of  47.3        
Congo, Rep. of  52.9        
Côte d’Ivoire   46.9  34.5     
Ethiopia   26.6  44.3     
Ghana   64.8  42.8     
Kenya   37.4  35.7     
Lesotho   100  35.2     
Madagascar     60     
Malawi     36     
Mali   64.9        
Mozambique   42.8  47.4     
Niger   58.7  99.9     
Nigeria   39.1  51     
Rwanda   5.5        
Senegal   62.7  58.6     
South Africa   17.2  7.5     
Tanzania   47.6  43.6     
Uganda      33.2     
Zimbabwe  30.5        
Source: Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic Power Tariff Database. 
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Annex 10. A calculation of long-run marginal costs 
The  long-run  marginal  cost  (LRMC)  of  power  was  calculated  using  the  investment  needs  model 
developed under the umbrella of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (Rossines and Vennemo 
2008). The model is based on estimates of future increase in demand and cost of corresponding supply. 
It minimizes the total annualized cost of system expansion and operation. This includes the operation 
and maintenance (O&M) cost of producing and distributing electricity according to expanded demand, 
as  well  as  the  capital  cost  of  refurbishing  old  capacity  and  constructing  new  capacity,  including 
generation plants, cross-border transmission, and distribution and connection.  
The model is run under two trade scenarios (trade expansion, under which all economically viable cross-
border transmission capacity is developed, and trade stagnation, under which no further cross-border 
transmission capacity is built) and three future access-rate assumptions (current access level, 35 percent 
access, and national access targets).  
As model outcomes, two sets of country-level LRMCs are produced: (i) LRMC under trade expansion, 
national access targets and (ii) LRMC under trade stagnation, national access targets.  
Some details of demand and cost of meeting demand estimations: 
Projecting  power  demand  over  2005–15.  Demand  consists  of  (i)  market  demand  associated  with 
different levels of economic growth, structural change, and population growth; (ii) suppressed demand 
created by blackouts and practice of power rationing; and (iii) social demand, as expressed in political 
targets for increasing popular access to electricity. Based on historic trends, demand is projected to 
grow at 5 percent per year in Sub-Saharan Africa to reach levels of 680 terawatt-hours (TWh), including: 
at 4–5 percent per year in SAPP and EAPP, at 7 percent per year in CAPP, 9 percent per year in the island 
states, and 12 percent per year in WAPP. 
Cost of supply needed to meet the projected demand comprises cost of refurbishment, new construction, 
and O&M. The analysis covers thermal generation—natural gas, coal, heavy fuel oil, and diesel—and 
renewable generation technologies—large hydropower, mini-hydro, solar photovoltaic, and geothermal. 
Operation of current nuclear power is considered, but not as new investment. 
  Cost  of  refurbishment  of  existing  capacity  is  estimated  based  on  refurbishment  needs  of  each 
country in megawatts (plant-specific data) and unit cost of refurbishment for thermo and hydro 
generation.  For  hydro  generation,  unit  costs  are  based  on  estimated  costs  of  actual  planned 
hydropower projects in each region. Thermal power plant technology is generic and the unit costs 
are therefore the same across countries. The refurbishment requirements for T&D are based on 
asset age. 
  Cost of construction of new capacity for cross-border electricity transmission is estimated. As in case 
of refurbishment, unit cost of construction is standard for thermal plants and country specific for 
hydro plants. Cost of T&D construction equals line length times unit cost. Unit costs of lines to be 
built—per km and per megawatt—are country specific. For lines between countries, average unit 
costs of two countries are used. 56 
 
 
  O&M includes fuel costs and variable costs of operation and maintenance of the system. The system 
includes both existing capacity as of 2005 that is still operating in 2015 and new capacity added over 
the 10-year period. Since the marginal costs of social demand (new connections) are driven by 
nonmarket considerations, they tend not to equalize with trade. Therefore, they are not considered 
in the LRMC calculation. 
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Annex 11. Effects on long-run marginal costs of trade expansion 




































































































































































Angola  45  5   (6.0)  41  843 
Guinea-Bissau  44  7   (0.2)  100  65 
Liberia   43  6   (1.7)  100  350 
Chad   36  4   (1.3)  100  29 
Mozambique  33  2   5.9   9  2,383 
Burundi   27  4   (0.7)  3  92 
Congo   25  2   (4.4)  24  400 
Equatorial Guinea   20  2   (0.1)  77  28 
Niger   17  5   (1.5)  100  105 
Lesotho  14  1   (0.7)  0  76 
South Africa  14  1   (36.4)  91  40,481 
Zimbabwe  11  1   (3.5)  64  8,890 
Mali   11  3   (1.9)  45  515 
Sierra Leone   10  1   (0.9)  92  80 
Togo   9  1   (0.9)  21  230 
Senegal   9  4   (1.4)  100  300 
Namibia  8  1   (3.8)  6  393 
Kenya   8  1   (2.8)  39  1,211 


































Benin   0  0   (0.9)  98  60 
Botswana  0  0   (4.3)  100  132 
Central African Republic   0  0  —  53  115 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of  0  0   51.9   1  2,443 
Côte d’Ivoire   0  0   0.9   44  1,084 
Gabon   0  0   (1.0)  59  1,774 
Ghana   0  0   (9.6)  26  1,622 
Malawi  0  0   (1.5)  8  285 
Nigeria   0  0   2.1   67  5,898 
Rwanda  0  0     10  31 
Sudan   0  0   13.1   68  4,341 































Uganda   –9  –1   2.8   26  321 
Gambia   –14  –1   0.1   100  160 
Cameroon   –17  –1   6.7   8  902 
Guinea   –17  –1   17.4   54  850 
Ethiopia   –19  –3   26.2   17  755 
Tanzania   –25  –2   2.4   39  881 




Annex 12. Average monthly electricity tab based on subsistence consumption 
   Monthly electricity tab ($)  
Monthly electricity tab as a percentage 
of household budget (%):  
connected households 
Monthly electricity tab as a percentage 







































































































































































































































Benin   12.6    13.3    13.6    5.0    8.0    10.9    9.4    14.9    20.3  
Burkina Faso   20.6    20.2    20.0    4.4    6.5    8.5    13.4    19.8    26.2  
Cameroon   8.6    10.9    10.9    3.1    5.8    7.8    6.0    11.4    15.2  
Cape Verde   23.6    25.1    25.8                    
Chad   22.9    27.3    30.0    1.6    2.9    4.3    4.0    7.2    10.6  
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. of   4.0    4.0    4.0                    
Côte d’Ivoire   9.6    11.1    11.9    1.5    2.7    3.8    3.3    5.7    8.1  
Ethiopia   3.9    4.1    4.1    2.2    3.5    4.6    3.8    5.9    7.9  
Ghana   8.7    8.4    8.2    2.1    3.0    3.9    3.3    4.8    6.2  
Kenya   8.4    12.7    14.8    1.7    3.9    6.1    3.6    8.1    12.6  
Lesotho   7.2    7.2    7.2                    
Madagascar   6.0    4.0    3.0    0.5    0.5    0.5    1.5    1.5    1.5  
Malawi   4.8    4.3    4.0    1.9    2.6    3.2    3.7    4.9    6.2  
Mozambique   9.6    7.7    6.8    3.2    3.9    4.5    8.7    10.5    12.3  
Namibia   11.7    11.7    11.7                    
Niger   14.5    14.2    14.1    3.3    4.8    6.4    7.1    10.4    13.7  
Nigeria   2.5    3.8    3.4    1.2    2.7    3.3    2.1    4.9    5.8  
Rwanda   14.6    14.6    14.6    3.0    4.5    6.0    7.7    11.6    15.5  
Senegal   18.6    16.4    15.2    3.1    4.0    5.0    5.9    7.8    9.7  
South Africa  —    2.4    3.6    —    0.3    0.6   —   1.4    2.7  
Sudan                            
Tanzania   3.2    5.5    6.7    1.6    4.2    6.7    2.9    7.5    12.1  
Uganda   19.5    20.7    21.4    4.1    6.5    8.9    10.7    17.0    23.4  
Zambia   4.2    3.3    2.9    1.2    1.4    1.6    2.8    3.4    3.9  
Source: AICD Power Tariffs Database 




   59 
 
 
Annex 13. Social tariff schedules  
  











social tranche  n.a.  n.a.     56  0.10 
Burkina Faso 
1 to 3 A, tranche 1             94   0.18     75  0.14 
Cameroon* 
tranche 1 residential           7,500   12.90     50  0.09 
Cape Verde 
tranche 1 residential  —  —     20            0.23  
Chad 
tranche 1 residential  n.a.  n.a.     83  0.16 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 
social tariff  2.65  0.01     n.a.  0.04 
Côte d’Ivoire 
tranche 1 residential  333  0.64     36  0.07 
Ethiopia 
tranche 1 residential  1.4  0.16     0.27  0.03 
Ghana 
tranche 1 residential  5,000  0.54     700  0.08 
Kenya 
tranche 1 residential  —  1.74     n.a.  0.05 
Lesotho 
—  —  —     —  — 
Madagascar 
economic tariff  600  0.30  25  120  0.06 
  
            553  0.28 
Malawi 
tranche 1 residential             125             0.92      2.67  0.02 
Mozambique 
tranche 1 residential   n.a.   n.a.     1,010  0.04 
Namibia 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.     n.a.  n.a. 
Niger 
—  —  —     —  — 
Nigeria 
"pensioners"  30            0.23      4            0.03  
Rwanda 
—  —  —     —  — 
Senegal 
tranche 1 residential  n.a.  n.a.  150  106  0.24 
South Africa 
tranche 1 residential  n.a.  n.a.     0  0 
Sudan 
—  —  —     —  — 
Tanzania 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.     38  0.03 
Uganda 
tranche 1 residential  2000            1.09      62            0.03  
Zambia 
tranche 1 residential  5,845             1.31      70            0.02  
Congo, Rep. of 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.     n.a.  n.a. 
Mali 
social tariff  n.a.  n.a.  50  59            0.13  
  
      100  91            0.20  
  
      200  107            0.24  
  
         >200  124            0.28  
Botswana 
n.a.  n.a.  n.a.     n.a.  n.a. 
Zimbabwe 
tranche 1 residential  n.a.  n.a.     29,289            0.01  
Source: AICD Power Tariffs Database 
n.a. Not applicable. 
— Not available. 
* Cameroon: fixed residential charge is 2,500 per kW if subscribed load is up to 200 hours and 4,200 per kW if it is above 200 hours. 60 
 
Annex 14. Operational inefficiencies 




















































































































































































Benin  12.8  39.1  0.5  13.8  0.2  0.7  0.0  0.2 
Botswana  0.7  138.7  61.1     0.0  1.8  0.8  — 
Burkina Faso  12.5  0.0  14.7  9.5  0.2  0.0  0.3  0.2 
Cameroon  36.3  57.9  0.0  8.3  0.8  1.2  0.0  0.2 
Cape Verde  8.1  0.0  29.6  20.8  0.2  0.0  0.9  0.6 
Chad  11.0  0.0  9.1  23.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1 
Congo, Rep. 
of  63.1  30.9  21.0  30.9  0.6  0.3  0.2  0.3 
Côte d’Ivoire  —  0.0  417.1  24.2  —  0.0  4.4  0.3 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. of  163.6  201.6  0.0  —  1.3  1.6  0.0  — 
Ethiopia  18.6  33.5  6.3  —  0.2  0.3  0.1  — 
Ghana  26.5  52.4  2.1  —  0.7  1.5  0.1  — 
Kenya  9.1  0.0  34.6  5.1  0.3  0.0  1.1  0.2 
Lesotho  16.9  32.5  19.5  —  0.3  0.6  0.3  — 
Madagascar  5.0  2.3  0.0  —  0.3  0.2  0.0  — 
Malawi  40.5  105.3  75.1  —  0.5  1.3  0.9  — 
Mali  23.4  36.8  39.1  6.4  0.6  1.0  1.0  0.2 
Mozambique  19.9  15.0  4.6  17.7  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.3 
Namibia  51.6  0.0  —  —  0.1  0.0  —  — 
Niger  39.1  116.5  0.0  12.5  0.6  1.8  0.0  0.2 
Nigeria  76.8  195.1  50.3  —  0.4  1.0  0.3  — 
Rwanda  10.8  9.3  0.0  6.8  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.1 
Senegal  9.6  0.0  10.8  5.4  0.3  0.0  0.3  0.2 
South Africa  0.0  5.9  0.0  —  0.0  1.0  0.0  — 
Tanzania  33.5  90.9  0.0  6.1  0.5  1.3  0.0  0.1 
Uganda  34.6  0.0  39.4  5.2  0.6  0.0  0.7  0.1 
Zambia  2.9  72.9  2.3  —  0.0  1.2  0.0  — 
Source: Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster, 2008 
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About AICD and its country reports 
This study is a product of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD), a project designed to 
expand the world’s knowledge of physical infrastructure in Africa. AICD provides a baseline against 
which future improvements in infrastructure services can be measured, making it possible to monitor 
the results achieved from donor support. It also offers a solid empirical foundation for prioritizing 
investments and designing policy reforms in Africa’s infrastructure sectors.  
the AICD is based on an unprecedented effort to collect detailed economic and technical data on African 
infrastructure. The project has produced a series of original reports on public expenditure, spending 
needs, and sector performance in each of the main infrastructure sectors, including energy, information 
and communication technologies, irrigation, transport, and water and sanitation. Africa’s 
Infrastructure—A Time for Transformation, published by the World Bank and the Agence Française de 
Développement in November 2009, synthesized the most significant findings of those reports.  
The focus of the AICD country reports is on benchmarking sector performance and quantifying the main 
financing and efficiency gaps at the country level. These reports are particularly relevant to national 
policy makers and development partners working on specific countries. 
The AICD was commissioned by the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa following the 2005 G8 (Group 
of Eight) summit at Gleneagles, Scotland, which flagged the importance of scaling up donor finance for 
infrastructure in support of Africa’s development.  
The AICD’s first phase focused on 24 countries that together account for 85 percent of the gross 
domestic product, population, and infrastructure aid flows of Sub-Saharan Africa. The countries are: 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Under a second phase of the project, 
coverage was expanded to include as many of the remaining African countries as possible.  
Consistent with the genesis of the project, the main focus is on the 48 countries south of the Sahara that 
face the most severe infrastructure challenges. Some components of the study also cover North African 
countries so as to provide a broader point of reference. Unless otherwise stated, therefore, the term 
“Africa” is used throughout this report as a shorthand for “Sub-Saharan Africa.” 
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The World Bank has implemented the AICD with the guidance of a steering committee that represents 
the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Africa’s regional economic 
communities, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), 
and major infrastructure donors.  
Financing for the AICD is provided by a multidonor trust fund to which the main contributors are the 
United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), the Public Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility (PPIAF), Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the European Commission, and 
Germany’s Entwicklungsbank (KfW). A group of distinguished peer reviewers from policy-making and 
academic circles in Africa and beyond reviewed all of the major outputs of the study to ensure the 
technical quality of the work. The Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program and the Water and 
Sanitation Program provided technical support on data collection and analysis pertaining to their 
respective sectors. 
The data underlying the AICD’s reports, as well as the reports themselves, are available to the public 
through an interactive Web site, www.infrastructureafrica.org, that allows users to download 
customized data reports and perform various simulations. Many AICD outputs will appear in the World 
Bank’s Policy Research Working Papers series. 
Inquiries concerning the availability of data sets should be directed to the volume editors at the World 
Bank in Washington, DC. 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 